The statements made by a mother who brought her child’s “lifeless body” into the hospital were admissible under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule, even though three days had passed since the child was abused and assaulted by the mother’s boyfriend, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.
In People v Trout (Docket No. 370221), the mother, Pavelka, had awoken to the “lifeless body” of her 2-year-old daughter, JM, three days after the child had been physically abused by the defendant, who was Pavelka’s boyfriend. Pavelka eventually convinced the defendant to take JM to the hospital. On the way, the defendant threatened to kill Pavelka’s mom and her other children.
When she got to the hospital, Pavelka was “crying” and “blurting out statements” to a hospital technician. JM was pronounced dead on arrival. Doctors found 85 separate external injuries on JM’s body, including bruises, scratches and ligature marks, and determined that JM died due to cerebral injuries inflicted by multiple blunt force trauma.
At the defendant’s trial for murder and child abuse, the prosecution filed a motion to admit testimony from the hospital technician regarding Pavelka’s statements, claiming they were admissible under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule, MRE 803(2). The Alcona County Circuit Court granted the motion, finding that although three days had passed before JM was taken to the hospital, Pavelka was still under the stress of the event and the threats made by the defendant. The defendant was ultimately convicted of second-degree murder and first-degree child abuse, and sentenced to 55 to 90 years and 30 to 60 years in prison, respectively.
The defendant appealed his conviction. He argued the trial court erroneously allowed the technician to testify as to what Pavelka said upon entering the hospital holding JM’s lifeless body.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The prosecution “amply satisfied the excited-utterance exception; we therefore disagree with defendant that the trial court’s admission of Pavelka’s statements as excited utterances represented an abuse of discretion meriting reversal,” the Court of Appeals said.
Judge Christopher M. Trebilcock, Judge Philip P. Mariani and Judge Kathleen A. Feeney were on the panel that issued the 12-page published and binding opinion.
In making its ruling, the Court of Appeals relied on case law to emphasize there is no strict time limit for admitting statements under MRE 803(2). Rather, trial courts must examine the circumstances and determine whether the declarant was still under the stress of the startling event when the statement was made. According to the appeals court, a controlling inquiry is not simply how much time passed, but whether the declarant had the capacity for “conscious reflection and fabrication.”
MRE 803(2): Excited-Utterance Exception
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals first analyzed MRE 803(2)’s excited-utterance exception.
MRE 803(2) provides that an excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused,” the Court of Appeals explained. The appeals court also pointed out the excited-utterance exception recognizes that a person experiencing an overwhelming emotional event may lack the reflective capacity necessary to fabricate or deliberately misrepresent what happened.
The Court of Appeals continued by explaining that, in People v Smith, 456 Mich 543 (1998), the Michigan Supreme Court said the focus of MRE 803(2) “is the lack of capacity to fabricate, not the lack of time to fabricate.” The appeals court further noted that Michigan law has evolved from the three requirements for admissibility identified in People v Gee, 406 Mich 279 (1979), to the two requirements articulated in Smith. Those two Smith requirements are: 1) there must be a startling event and 2) the resulting statement must be made while the declarant remains under the excitement caused by that event.
According to the Court of Appeals, it is important to recognize that the second requirement – the resulting statement must be made while the declarant remains under the excitement caused by the event – does not mandate the statement immediately follow the startling event. Rather, citing People v Straight, 430 Mich 418 (1988), the appeals court said the inquiry is whether the declarant was still under the influence of an overwhelming emotional condition when the statement was made.
Trial courts can consider several factors when making this determination, the Court of Appeals observed. Those factors include: 1) the nature of the startling event, 2) the character of the statement, 3) the declarant’s condition, 4) the identity of the declarant, 5) the availability of other evidence and 5) physical factors such as shock, unconsciousness or pain that may prolong the period during which the risk of fabrication is reduced.
Passage Of Time Not Dispositive
In this case, the Court of Appeals said the primary issue was whether Pavelka remained under the stress of the startling event when she made the statements to the hospital technician, despite the fact that three days had passed.
The defendant argued that, pursuant to Gee, the delay between the underlying events and Pavelka’s statements at the hospital gave her sufficient time to consider her self-interest and fabricate an account. In Gee, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a 12-to-20-hour delay was significant because there was no plausible explanation for the delay that would justify extending the exception.
The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that the passage of time, by itself, required excluding Pavelka’s statements. Quoting Smith, the appeals court stated: “Though the time that passes between the event and the statement is an important factor to be considered in determining whether the declarant was still under the stress of the event when the statement was made, it is not dispositive. It is necessary to consider whether there was a plausible explanation. The appeals court also emphasized that “there is no express time limit for excited utterances.”
According to the Court of Appeals, Pavelka’s emotional state at the hospital supported the admission of her statements under MRE 803(2). At trial, the hospital technician described Pavelka as upset and crying, and testified that she began “rambling” and “blurting things out,” including statements that incriminated the defendant. The appeals court noted the technician witnessed an emotional Pavelka recounting the circumstances surrounding the assault on JM, the defendant’s refusal to obtain medical care for JM, finding JM’s lifeless body and the defendant’s threats against her family. These circumstances, the appeals court said, supported the conclusion that Pavelka remained under the stress caused by the events.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the defendant’s argument that Pavelka’s ability to perform other activities during the three days demonstrated that she had the capacity to fabricate. The defendant specifically pointed to Pavelka working and attempting to obtain drugs for him to sell as evidence that she had time for “conscious reflection.” This argument took too narrow a view of the startling events that led to Pavelka’s emotional breakdown, the appeals court said. According to the appeals courts, the relevant circumstances were not limited to the initial assault and, instead, involved an ongoing series of traumatic events, including the assault itself, the delay in obtaining medical treatment, waking up to find JM lifeless and the defendant’s threats against Pavelka’s family. In reaching this conclusion, the appeals court cited People v Kowalak, 215 Mich App 554 (1996), which recognized that “[i]t is hard to conceive of a more startling (or terrifying) event with which one might be confronted than a serious death threat.”
The present case “reflects that conception,” the Court of Appeals said. “[T]he record makes clear Pavelka’s upheaval at the hospital was a culmination of the three-day period, beginning with defendant’s initial assault of JM, to Pavelka awakening to JM’s lifeless body that morning, and through his threats to kill her family members if she refused to lie about JM’s injuries as they drove to the hospital. One can easily conclude those traumatic events were not isolated incidents allowing for ‘the possibility for conscious reflection’ thereafter, … but rather were a series of related happenings that built on top of each other. Put differently, they ‘support an inference that the statement[s were] made out of a continuing state of emotional shock precipitated by the’ 72 hours of startling events.”
Based on the foregoing, “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Pavelka’s statements to the technician under the excited-utterance exception, and we need not consider the prosecution’s alternative harmless-error argument,” the Court of Appeals concluded.
