Court of Appeals Clarifies that the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law Provides a Mechanism to Establish Legal Parenthood
Opinion Published: January 25, 2024 (Garret, P.J., and Letica and Maldonado, JJ.)
Court of Appeals Docket No. 366773
Authored by Judge Garrett
Liisa Speaker of the Speaker Law Firm represented Bethany Christian Services
The trial court correctly determined that a nonsurrendering parent who establishes a 99.99% probability of paternity and obtains summary disposition on the issue of paternity is a legal parent under the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law (SDNL). The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s decision to terminate nonsurrendering parent’s parental rights under the Juvenile Code rather than the Adoption Code.
In this SDNL appeal, the child-placing agency, Bethany Christian Services (BCS), challenged the trial court’s conclusion that the trial court’s order admitting nonsurrendering parent’s DNA results established nonsurrendering parent’s legal paternity. The Court of Appeals “conclude[d] that the trial court correctly found that petitioner was the child’s legal father under the provisions of the SDNL.”
BCS further argued that, because it believed nonsurrendering parent was not the legal father, termination of parental rights proceedings under the Juvenile Code would be futile, and the trial court should have dismissed nonsurrendering parent’s custody petition to allow termination proceedings under the Adoption Code. However, because the Court of Appeals held that nonsurrendering parent was the legal parent, “the [trial] court did not err by ordering BCS to petition for jurisdiction under the juvenile code to seek termination of petitioner’s parental rights.”
Background
Baby Boy Doe was born January 2, 2023. He was surrendered by his mother at the hospital and placed with BCS. BCS quickly petitioned the trial court to place Baby Boy Doe with his prospective adoptive parents, and the trial court granted the petition. Baby Boy Doe was then placed with his prospective adoptive parents, where he remains today.
Soon after Baby Boy Doe was placed with his prospective adoptive parents, the nonsurrendering parent, Baby Boy Doe’s father, showed up at the hospital, asked about the child, and was informed of the SDNL. Nonsurrendering parent then petitioned for custody of Baby Boy Doe in the trial court and submitted to DNA testing, which yielded a 99.99% probability that nonsurrendering parent is Baby Boy Doe’s father. The trial court then signed an order stating that nonsurrendering parent is Baby Boy Doe’s “biological father.”
Soon after the biological relationship was established, nonsurrendering parent stopped participating in the proceedings. The trial court continued through the SDNL’s procedures and found that granting custody of Baby Boy Doe to nonsurrendering parent would not be in Baby Boy Doe’s best interest. Accordingly, the trial court specifically ordered that nonsurrendering parent’s parental rights be terminated in proceedings under the Juvenile Code.
BCS moved for reconsideration of that order. BCS argued that proceedings under the Juvenile Code would be futile because the Juvenile Code grants jurisdiction to terminate a legal parent’s parental rights, not a biological parent’s rights, so a court could not obtain jurisdiction over Baby Boy Doe under MCL 712A.2b. Moreover, BCS argued that Juvenile Code proceedings be further rendered futile because Baby Boy Doe was not in foster care or a guardianship, so the court could not terminate rights under MCL 712A.19b. Rather, BCS argued that proceedings under the Adoption Code would be more appropriate to terminate nonsurrendering parent’s parental rights as a putative father. The trial court denied reconsideration, concluding that its order determining paternity established nonsurrendering parent as the legal father.
BCS appealed.
Legal Paternity under the SDNL
The Court of Appeals began its analysis with outlining the procedures of the SDNL. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that “[t]he SDNL is a rarely litigated but vital statute” that “provides a statutory framework for determining paternity of a nonsurrendering parent, and if applicable, granting custody of a newborn to that parent.”
In this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the trial court correctly found that petitioner was the child’s legal father under the provisions of the SDNL.” MCL 712.11(3) provides that paternity is presumed based on a high-probability DNA testing, and the custody petitioner may move for summary disposition on the issue of paternity. According to the Court of Appeals, “[t]he most logical understanding of this provision is that the presumption becomes a definitive finding of legal paternity if the petitioner moves for and obtains summary disposition.” Moreover, the SDNL’s paternity procedures are “comparable or identical to those of the Paternity Act in several respects,” so the Paternity Act is not the only “statutory mechanism for a nonsurrendering father to establish legal parenthood.”
The Court of Appeals also acknowledged that the SDNL allows the trial court to award the nonsurrendering parent physical or legal custody of the child under MCL 712.15(a). And because only a legal parent can have legal custody of a child, the SDNL must contain a mechanism to establish legal parenthood. Accordingly, “trial court followed the statutory procedures under the SDNL and correctly determined that petitioner was the child’s legal father.”
Terminating Parental Rights
The Court of Appeals also addressed BCS’s argument that because nonsurrendering parent is not a legal father, the court could not take jurisdiction in proceedings under the Juvenile Code. Because the Court of Appeals concluded that “that petitioner was the child’s legal parent, not merely a putative parent,” the Court of Appeals held that the trial court may take jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2b.
The Court of Appeals also addressed BCS’s argument that the Juvenile Code is a dead end under MCL 712A.19b(1). Baby Boy Doe was not in foster care or in a guardianship, so BCS argued that termination would be impossible under that provision. However, the Court of Appeals, quoting In re Marin, 198 Mich App 560, 568; 499 NW2d 400 (1993), stated that MCL 712A.19b(1) does not “‘limit the conditions under which a petition to terminate parental rights may be entertained by the court.’” Thus, although Baby Boy Doe is placed with his prospective adoptive parents and not in foster care or a guardianship, termination of nonsurrendering parent’s parental rights is possible under MCL 712A.19b.
Finally, although the relevant SCAO form (Form CCFD 06) allows the trial court to terminate parental rights, the SDNL does not allow the court to terminate parental rights. Thus, “[t]he [trial] court correctly declined to follow the language of the SCAO form indicating that it could immediately terminate petitioner’s parental rights when the SDNL did not allow it to do so.” Instead, because the trial court determined that it was not in Baby Boy Doe’s best interest to award nonsurrendering father custody, the trial court was constrained to follow MCL 712.15(b), which requires termination proceedings under the Juvenile Code.
The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the trial court’s order requiring termination of nonsurrendering parent’s parental rights as a legal father under the Juvenile Code.
