Court Of Appeals Reverses Trial Court’s Grant Of Summary Disposition After Finding Loading Exception Applies
Opinion Published: November 3, 2025 (Ackerman, Swartzle, Trebilcock)
COA Docket No. 371878
Wayne County Circuit Court
Holding: The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court’s grant of summary disposition because Michigan law recognizes a critical exception for loading or uploading in its definition of parking, and thus Plaintiff’s conduct fits within that exception, and because comparative negligence is a question for the jury.
Facts: Plaintiff dropped her daughter off at the Municipal Center in Detroit so she could record a deed. Plaintiff’s daughter called to say she was ready to be picked up, and Plaintiff pulled into an opening along M-10 in front of the building, stopping in front of a fire hydrant. The spot Plaintiff stopped in was a designated bus stop marked by a sign that read “NO STANDING EXCEPT D.O.T. COACHES.” Plaintiff was unaware of the sign when she parked. Plaintiff stopped the vehicle without parking, and her daughter began to enter the car.
Defendant was driving a bus owned by co-Defendant, Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation. Defendant attempted to pull into the designated bus stop to discharge and board passengers, and the rear of the bus clipped the front side of Plaintiff’s car. Plaintiff alleges she was injured and filed a complaint against Defendants for negligence. Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10), arguing that Plaintiff failed to establish her claim for gross negligence and that her conduct constituted negligence per se, making her more than 50% at fault. The Trial Court agreed with Defendants and granted summary disposition to Defendants. Plaintiff appealed.
Key Appellate Rulings:
Negligence per se does not impact the fact that an allocation of fault is a question for the jury under MCL 600.6304.
In an auto-negligence action, damages have to be assessed on the basis of comparative fault. Further, questions of comparative fault are for the jury. The Court of Appeals held that negligence per se does not alter these principles. The court can only decide as a matter of law that the jury could find a causal connection between the statutory violation and the accident, and it is for the jury to decide whether a violation of a statute was a proximate cause of the accident.
In this case, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants acted negligently. Defendants did not argue that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted before the Trial Court or on appeal. Therefore, the Court assumed that Plaintiff had a prima facie case of negligence against Defendants. The questions of negligence belong to the jury, and thus it was improper for the Trial Court to grant summary disposition.
MCL 257.674(1) is not violated when an individual is temporarily stopped to allow another person to enter the vehicle, as this does not constitute being “parked” within the meaning of the statute.
Defendants argued that Plaintiff violated MCL 257.674(1), which provides that “[a] vehicle must not be parked either ‘[w]ithin 15 feet of a fire hydrant’ or ‘at a place where an official sign prohibits stopping or parking.’” MCL 257.674(1)(d) and (n). However, the Michigan Vehicle Code defines “parking” as “standing a vehicle, whether occupied or not upon a highway, when not loading or unloading except when making necessary repairs.” MCL 257.38. Thus, the Court held that a vehicle engaged in loading or unloading is not “parked” even if it is otherwise motionless. The Court also acknowledged that if a car is not “parked” while unloading, even if directly in front of a fire hydrant, the prohibition in MCL 257.674(1)(d) is weakened.
In this case, Defendants conceded that Plaintiff had her foot456 on the brake and was helping to load her daughter into the vehicle. Therefore, since Plaintiff was undisputedly engaged in loading, she was by definition not “parked” under MCL 257.38 and thus could not have been illegally parked under MCL 257.674(1).
