Jury Must Decide Comparative Fault Issue In Negligence Case Involving Teen’s Suicide
In this case involving the suicide of a teenage resident at the Calumet Center, a Michigan-licensed child-caring institution, the trial court should not have granted summary disposition for the plaintiff-parents on the issue of comparative fault because it was a factual question for the jury, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.
The plaintiffs’ son, JQ, committed suicide by hanging himself with a sheet in his room at the Calumet Center. The plaintiffs subsequently filed this negligence action, Estate of JQ v Spectrum Juvenile Justice Services (Docket No. 363750), against the defendants, Spectrum Juvenile Justice Services (SJJS), which operates the Calumet Center, and its parent company, Spectrum Human Services, Inc. (SHS). The plaintiffs claimed that staff members at the facility “failed to properly supervise residents” and “falsified room-monitoring logs to reflect room checks of residents that were not performed as required under state of Michigan regulations.” The plaintiffs also alleged the defendants’ failure to monitor residents made it possible for their son to take his own life.
The defendants argued the Wayne County Circuit Court should dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims because, among other things, they were immune from liability under MCL 691.1635 of the Social Services Agency Liability Act (SSALA), MCL 691.1631 et seq., because their conduct did not constitute gross negligence. The trial court denied the defendants’ motions as they pertained to immunity under the SSALA, piercing the corporate veil, causation and foreseeability, and comparative fault. The trial court, however, granted summary disposition to the plaintiffs on the issue of comparative fault. The defendants appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.
“We conclude that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in plaintiffs’ favor regarding comparative fault and that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, creates genuine issues of material fact regarding that issue and the remaining issues,” the Court of Appeals said. “JQ’s intentional act of committing suicide must be considered, and his age, 15 years old at the time of his death, does not relieve him from fault for the commission of an intentional act. … Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Judge Anica Letica authored the published opinion, joined by Judge Kathleen A. Feeney.
Judge Kristina Robinson Garrett issued a separate concurring opinion, saying she agreed with the majority’s resolution of the issues. “I write separately to highlight JQ’s journal entries, which illustrate his deteriorating mental health in the short time he was a resident at Calumet. I also write separately because, although I agree with the majority’s comparative-fault analysis, I do so reluctantly as the applicable legal authority allows defendants to rely on JQ’s suicide in defense or mitigation of their liability despite plaintiffs alleging that defendants negligently failed to prevent JQ’s suicide.”
SSALA Immunity
On appeal, the defendants first argued the trial court wrongly denied them summary disposition on the SSALA immunity claim.
“We disagree,” the Court of Appeals said, noting the SSALA’s purpose is to “grant immunity to a social service agency, and its officers and employees, for injury or damage caused by the provision of a child social welfare program, subject to an exception for gross negligence or willful misconduct.” Citing MCL 691.1637, the appeals court also pointed out that, when a lawsuit is filed challenging the conduct of a child social welfare program, “it is presumed that the specified actors of the social services agency acted within the scope of their authority and that their conduct did not amount to gross negligence nor willful misconduct.”
Addressing whether the SSALA applied, the Court of Appeals explained that “DHHS licensed SJJS as a ‘Child Caring Institution.’ The license identifies Calumet as the name of the facility. SJJS contracted with DHHS to provide residential treatment for certain youth under age 18 who were involved in the juvenile justice system. … [A] licensing consultant with DHHS … testified that he regulated the licensing rules for child care institutions, including Calumet. In light of the record evidence, the services provided by Calumet constituted a ‘child social welfare program’ and SJJS is a ‘social services agency’ under the SSALA.”
Therefore, because SJJS is a social services agency under the SSALA and JQ’s death occurred while providing a “child social welfare program,” the Court of Appeals examined whether SJJS was immune from liability under MCL 691.1635(3) or (4).
When deciding motions for summary disposition in these kinds of cases, the trial court “may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations,” the Court of Appeals emphasized. “That is, the trial court is not to decide the credibility of the various witnesses. … The trial court may not make factual findings, and if the evidence conflicts, summary disposition is improper. … Indeed, courts must be liberal in finding a factual dispute that withstands summary disposition.”
Here, “testimony of the witnesses reflects conflicts in the evidence and credibility determinations that preclude a ruling on the issue of gross negligence as a matter of law,” the Court of Appeals explained, referencing testimony given by various Calumet employees regarding room checks and attempted suicides at the facility. “In contrast to th[is] employee testimony, others denied the claims raised by the employees. And [one witness] testified that he expected that suicide attempts would be reported for investigation; however, he did not receive such reports in accordance with the claims made by the former employees.”
The evidence “creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the actions and inactions of staff members amounted to gross negligence such that SJJS is not immune under the SSALA,” the Court of Appeals said. “The evidence supports plaintiffs’ allegations that staff members failed to conduct room checks at varying intervals not to exceed 15 minutes as required under Rule 400.4127(4) notwithstanding that the purpose of the room checks was to ensure resident safety. Further, JQ’s journal entries indicate that he became increasingly more depressed and anxious as the days passed. The testimony also establishes a genuine issue of material fact regarding youth-care workers being trained to fill out the pink sheets at the beginning of their shifts before the room checks could possibly be made, that some supervisors also prefilled out the pink sheets, and that some workers forged their supervisor’s signature.”
Meanwhile, other witnesses “testified that they did not know about JQ’s history of depression, anxiety, panic attacks, and self-harm, and, if they had known, they could have been more watchful of him,” the Court of Appeals observed. “In fact, [one witness] testified that if she had been informed of JQ’s psychiatric history, his suicide could have been prevented. Staff members testified that they were also unaware that JQ had been cutting himself, although [one staff member] was aware and testified that JQ’s cuts were visible. Therefore, at a minimum, there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the evidence demonstrates ‘a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury will result.’ … Accordingly, the trial court properly denied summary disposition with respect to immunity under the SSALA.”
Other Arguments Rejected
The Court of Appeals continued by addressing the defendants’ additional arguments, including that the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence “to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding piercing the corporate veil.”
The trial court “properly denied summary disposition regarding piercing the corporate veil,” the Court of Appeals stated. “The testimony shows that there was significant overlap between SJJS and SHS. Some of SJJS’s board members sat on SHS’s board of directors, and the two companies shared a human resources department. … Accordingly, the evidence demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact with respect to piercing the corporate veil.”
As to causation and foreseeability, “[w]e disagree [with the defendants] and conclude that the trial court properly determined that there existed a question of fact regarding those issues,” the Court of Appeals said. “Plaintiffs submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that JQ’s suicide was foreseeable. His journal entries, contained in the complaint, show that he was having a very difficult time coping. He was having trouble sleeping, was often tired, and felt extremely depressed and anxious. His mental condition appeared to be getting worse the longer he was at Calumet, and medical personnel more than tripled his dose of Zoloft, a psychotropic medication, after he arrived.”
Moreover, the plaintiffs “presented evidence to support their allegation that defendants were aware of residents using the vents as an anchor point to hang themselves,” the Court of Appeals observed. “Accordingly, plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation and foreseeability pertaining to plaintiffs’ negligence and gross negligence claims.”
Further, the plaintiffs had claimed it was foreseeable that staff members would not conduct required room checks because it was “widely known” that they failed to do so. “The testimony showed that even supervisors failed to conduct room checks as required, new employees were trained to prefill out the pink sheets, and some employees even signed their supervisor’s signature on the forms,” the Court of Appeals wrote. “Because the very purpose of the room checks was to ensure the safety of the residents, plaintiffs assert it was inevitable that the employees’ failure to conduct room checks would result in an incident such as the one that occurred. Thus, the evidence, at a minimum, demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding foreseeability as it pertains to plaintiffs’ negligent hiring or retention claim.”
Comparative Fault: A Jury Question
Lastly, the Court of Appeals addressed the defendants’ arguments that:
the trial court wrongly determined that JQ could not be “comparatively at fault” for causing his own death and
MCL 600.2959 precluded the plaintiffs from recovering noneconomic damages “because JQ was more than 50% at fault.”
“We agree [with the defendants] that the trial court erroneously granted summary disposition in plaintiffs’ favor under MCR 2.116(I)(2) regarding comparative fault, but conclude that there exists a jury question regarding the ultimate issue,” the Court of Appeals said.
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals explained the history of comparative negligence in Michigan. “[A]fter our Supreme Court abandoned the harsh consequences of contributory negligence and its bar of recovery in favor of comparative fault in Placek[v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 (1979)], our Legislature codified those principles. The plain language of MCL 600.2957 (allocating the liability of each person in direct proportion to the person’s percentage of fault), MCL 600.2959 (reducing the damages by the percentage of comparative fault of the person upon whose injury or death the damages are based and eliminating noneconomic damages), MCL 600.6304(1)(b) (requiring the allocation of liability among all persons who contributed to the plaintiff’s damages), and MCL 600.6304(8) (defining fault to include intentional conduct or acts that are a proximate cause of damage sustained by a party), require the allocation of liability among all persons who contributed to the plaintiff’s damages. … Thus, the comparative fault statutes apply to all persons, including the plaintiff, who are found to be at fault, i.e., whose conduct is a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages.”
A plaintiff “will be considered at fault if a defendant proves that the plaintiff’s conduct was both a cause in fact and a legal, or proximate, cause of his own damages,” the Court of Appeals said. “And, the allocation of fault even applies to a plaintiff’s intentional conduct. The defendant bears the burden of proving the plaintiff’s conduct was a proximate cause of his own damages. … It is apparent from Michigan’s adoption of comparative fault, the plain language of the comparative fault statutes, and the principles of causation that the intentional acts of a plaintiff are considered when apportioning fault and allocating damages.”
In the present case, “JQ’s intentional act of committing suicide must be considered, and his age, 15 years old at the time of his death, does not relieve him from fault for the commission of an intentional act,” the Court of Appeals explained. “Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs under MCR 2.116(I)(2) because the issue presents a factual question for the jury. Similarly, a jury must determine whether plaintiffs met their burden of proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence when it evaluates the witnesses’ credibility.
Therefore, “[w]e conclude that the SSALA applies in this case and that the evidence established a genuine issue of material fact regarding gross negligence, which precludes immunity under the act,” the Court of Appeals held. “Similarly, there exist questions of material fact for trial regarding piercing the corporate veil, causation and foreseeability, negligent hiring or retention, and comparative fault. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
