Michigan Court Of Appeals Clarifies Scope Of Specific Devises Categorizing Personal Property Under EPIC

In re Estate of Neal D. Nielsen

• Opinion Published: April 27, 2026 (Garrett, P.J., and Rick and Feeney, JJ.)

• Docket No. 368054

• Livingston County Probate Court

Holding: Under Michigan’s Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), a testamentary devise of categories of personal property — each prefaced with the word “my” and intended for a specific, named devisee — constitutes a specific devise rather than a general devise. The Court of Appeals reversed the probate court’s contrary ruling and remanded for a determination of whether the decedent’s estate is “otherwise sufficient” under MCL 700.2405(1) to satisfy the children’s exempt-property allowance without resort to specifically devised property.

Facts: Neal D. Nielsen died on December 12, 2020. Although Neal and appellant Paula A. Nielsen had been married, they divorced in 2000 — a fact unknown to Neal’s adult children, as Neal and Paula continued to live together as husband and wife until his death. In the fifth article of his 2001 will, Neal bequeathed to “my wife, PAULA A. NIELSEN” his “household furniture and furnishings, automobiles, books, pictures, jewelry, art objects, hobby equipment and collections, wearing apparel, and other articles of household or personal use or ornament,” while excluding coins held for investment and paper currency. The will also provided that the same categories of property would pass to his children equally if Paula predeceased him, and that all remaining estate assets would pour over into Neal’s family trust.

After Neal’s death, the personal representative petitioned the probate court to confirm that the fifth article of the will constituted a specific devise, which would prevent Neal’s children from selecting items from it to satisfy their $16,000 exempt-property allowance (adjusted from the statutory $10,000 under MCL 700.1210). Neal’s children argued the devise was general because it described categories rather than particular items, pointing to a will clause reserving the right to leave a separate signed memorandum designating specific pieces to specific persons. The probate court agreed with the children and ruled the devise was general. This appeal followed.

Key Appellate Holdings:

The devise of categorized personal property prefaced with “my” is a specific devise.

EPIC does not define “specific devise” or “general devise,” so the court applied common-law definitions established before EPIC’s 1998 enactment. Under Morrow v Detroit Trust Co, 330 Mich 635 (1951), use of the word “my” is a classic indicator of a specific devise, reflecting a testator’s intent that the legatee receive the very thing bequeathed — not a corresponding value payable from general assets. That Neal described his property in categories (e.g., “household furniture,” “wearing apparel,” “hobby equipment and collections”) rather than itemizing each possession does not render the devise general. As recognized in In re Corby’s Estate, 154 Mich 353 (1908), even a bequest of “household furniture” is a specific legacy.

The memorandum clause does not convert specific devises into general ones.

Neal’s will reserved the right to leave a separate signed memorandum directing that particular items be given to certain persons — a mechanism authorized by MCL 700.2513. The probate court reasoned that this clause signaled the fifth article was merely a general devise, with specific designations to follow later. The Court of Appeals disagreed. Because Neal never executed such a memorandum, and because the will plainly expressed his intent that Paula receive all listed categories of property (with his children receiving the same property only if Paula predeceased him), the memorandum clause does not diminish the specific nature of the fifth article.

Specific items within the devise were identified and confirmed.

The court confirmed that Neal’s gun collection constitutes “hobby equipment” within the fifth article, and that his University of Michigan memorabilia constitutes a “collection.” Both items are therefore specifically devised to Paula. The court also confirmed that Neal’s bedroom furniture falls within the “household furniture” category, notwithstanding Christopher Nielsen’s desire to retain it as furniture from his childhood bedroom.

Paula is entitled to State Farm insurance proceeds for the totaled Chevrolet Silverado.

Several weeks before his death, Neal’s Chevrolet Silverado was in an accident and declared a total loss. State Farm issued a $9,100 check payable to Neal after he died. Because Neal specifically devised his “automobiles” to Paula, MCL 700.2606(1)(c), entitles Paula to “any proceeds unpaid at death on fire or casualty insurance on, or other recovery for, injury to the property.” The probate court had ruled in favor of the children on this issue; the Court of Appeals reversed.

The children did not waive their exempt-property allowance.

Paula argued that the children forfeited their exempt-property rights by failing to timely assert them. The court rejected this argument. MCL 700.2405 contains no limitations period, and subsection (2) expressly authorizes the personal representative to select exempt property if entitled persons fail to do so within a reasonable time. The question of whether the estate is “otherwise sufficient” under MCL 700.2405(1) — and thus whether the children may look to non-specifically devised property to satisfy the allowance — was remanded to the probate court.

The life insurance policy insuring Paula’s life is an asset of Neal’s trust.

A $50,000 life insurance policy on Paula’s life had been held by Neal’s law practice since 1986. Although the 2000 divorce settlement awarded Paula “life insurance policies insuring her life,” the property settlement also awarded Neal all business assets of Neal D. Nielsen, P.C. — the entity that owned the policy. Even assuming the settlement agreement was ambiguous, Paula signed the original policy application, demonstrating awareness of the policy’s existence. Having waited more than 20 years after the divorce to assert any claim to the policy, Paula’s claim is time-barred under the 10-year limitations period of MCL 600.5809(3) applicable to divorce property settlements.

The Ford F-150 is an asset of Neal’s trust, not his estate.

The Ford F-150 was owned by Ajax Leasing, LLC — a company titled solely in Neal’s name at his death. Under MCL 450.4504, a membership interest in an LLC is personal property, and Neal’s interest in Ajax Leasing poured over into his trust under the will’s residuary clause. Because Ajax Leasing — not Neal individually — owned the F-150, Paula’s bequest of Neal’s “automobiles” does not reach the vehicle. The court rejected Paula’s argument as disregarding Ajax Leasing’s separate corporate identity.