Michigan Court of Appeals Holds Short-Term Rental Guests Are Considered Invitees in Condominium Common Areas

Letvin v The Village at Grand Traverse Commons Condominium Association

• Opinion Published: July 13, 2026 (M. J. Kelly, P.J., and Patel and Korobkin, JJ.)

• COA Docket No. 376558

• Grand Traverse Circuit Court

Holding: In this premises liability action arising from a slip-and-fall on ice in a condominium parking lot, the Court of Appeals held, as a matter of first impression, that a short-term rental (Airbnb) guest of a condominium unit owner is an invitee—not a licensee—of the condominium association while using common elements that the association maintains.

Facts: Plaintiff and his wife rented a condominium unit within the Village at Grand Traverse Commons through Airbnb for the weekend of January 20–22, 2023. Defendant, the condominium association, had contracted with A.M.O. Inc. to plow and salt the property, but the association's board took no responsibility for monitoring A.M.O.'s work, and A.M.O.'s owner was unaware of anyone from the association who inspected it. On the evening of January 21, while walking through the parking lot to a waiting Uber, plaintiff slipped on ice and broke his arm. Photographs taken hours after the fall, and again the following day, showed ice and snow remaining in portions of the lot; plaintiff testified that only the sidewalks leading into the buildings had been salted.

Plaintiff sued defendant for premises liability. The trial court, relying on the Court of Appeals' decision in Gabrielson v Woods Condo Ass'n, Inc, 349 Mich App 478; 28 NW3d 747 (2024), concluded that plaintiff was only a licensee of defendant and was therefore owed merely a duty to warn of unreasonably dangerous conditions. The trial court further found no genuine issue of material fact as to breach of that duty and granted summary disposition in defendant's favor. Plaintiff appealed.

Key Appellate Holding:

A short-term rental guest of a condominium unit owner is an invitee, not a licensee, of the condominium association on the common elements that the association maintains.

The Court explained that Gabrielson's holding that a unit owner's renter was merely a licensee of the condominium association rested on reasoning that did not survive the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Janini v London Townhouses Condo Ass'n, 514 Mich 86; 22 NW3d 24 (2024). Janini overruled Francescutti v Fox Chase Condo Ass'n, 312 Mich App 640; 886 NW2d 891 (2015)—on which Gabrielson had relied—and held that condominium co-owners are invitees of their association because the association's bylaws obligate it to maintain common elements in exchange for dues, an arrangement the Supreme Court likened to the landlord-tenant relationship. Applying the first-out rule to reconcile Gabrielson with the earlier-decided Stanley v Town Square Coop, 203 Mich App 143; 512 NW2d 51 (1993)—which held that a cooperative association's pecuniary interest in permitting members to invite guests onto the property renders those guests invitees—the Court concluded that Stanley, not Gabrielson, controls. Because part of the fee a condominium unit owner pays the association compensates the association for maintaining common areas safely for owners and their guests, the Court held that defendant received an indirect pecuniary benefit from plaintiff's presence sufficient to render him an invitee of defendant while in the parking lot.

The Court also held that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary disposition on breach. Although defendant's snow-removal contractor had spread substantial amounts of salt over the weekend of the fall, plaintiff testified that ice remained throughout the parking lot and that only the sidewalks had been salted, and photographs taken shortly after the fall corroborated the presence of ice. Testimony that no one on defendant's board monitored the contractor's work, and that the contractor was unaware of any inspection by the association, raised a question of fact as to whether defendant provided adequate oversight of snow and ice removal, precluding summary disposition under Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95; 1 NW3d 44 (2023), and Quinlivan v The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, Inc, 395 Mich 244; 235 NW2d 732 (1975).