Michigan Court of Appeals Reinforces Service Requirements Under MCL 712A.13
COA Opinion Published: October 22, 2026 (Patel, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and Garrett, JJ.)
COA Docket No. 378547
Lake County Circuit Court
Holding: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court order of adjudication because the Trial Court had failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over Respondent-Mother under MCL 712A.13. Although Respondent-Mother received an amended petition by e-mail, the failure to comply with statutory demanded service was not cured by the email as the service of notice to parents is strictly construed.
Facts: The Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition that sought removal of all four children from the custody of respondent-father and the other mother after allegations of drug use, neglect, and homelessness. However, the petition included Respondent-Mother, who lived in New Mexico. Respondent-Mother was the mother of two out of the four children in this case, but she was not accused of any wrongdoing in the petition.
Following delays involving jurisdiction and tribal issues, DHHS filed an amended complaint, this time with allegations against the Respondent-Mother. At trial Respondent-Mother’s counsel had asked whether she had been personally served with the petition. A caseworker testified that she got a copy via “encrypted email” and the caseworker and the Respondent-Mother had discussed the petition over the phone, but Respondent-Mother was never served as she lived in New Mexico. Counsel then objected to a lack of personal service, but Trial Court continued and assumed jurisdiction over the children under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and then entered an initial dispositional order.
Key Appellate Holdings:
The Trial Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Respondent-Mother because DHHS failed to comply with MCL 712A.13.
MCL 712A.13 establishes the requirements for serving parents in a child-protection proceedings, allowing personal service or, when personal service is impractical, alternative service may be used only after a judge is satisfied that to serve personally would be impractical. The Court of Appeals here ruled that the statutory service requirements must be strictly construed. Although Respondent-Mother received the amended petition through the email and participated in some proceedings, DHHS never personally served her or attempted alternative service in accordance with the statute.
Actual notice and participation in the proceedings did not cure the failure to provide proper statutory service.
The Court of Appeals, using In re Brown and In re Mayfield, explained that actual notice and representation by counsel does not necessarily cure the failure to comply with the service requirement in child-protective proceedings. The Court distinguished Mayfield, as service in that case was attempted three times through first-class mail and although not permissible under the MCL 712A.13, the Court there reasoned that the first-class mail operated identically to the registered mail in the statute; the mail either registered or first-class ended up at the last-known address of that respondent. It then became apparent that service under the statue was exhausted. Here, DHHS made no attempts to serve Respondent-Mother at her last-known address. Furthermore, respondent-mother’s attorney expressly objected to the lack of personal service, preserving the objection under MCR 3.920(H).
The original petition did not establish personal jurisdiction, and the amended petition did not remedy that deficiency.
The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from In re Dearmon, which held that once personal jurisdiction was established, following amended petitions do not eliminate that jurisdiction. Unlike Dearmon, the inversion occurred here. Respondent-Mother was never personally served with the original petition, and that petition did not contain any allegations against her. Therefore, personal jurisdiction was never established.
