MSC Vacates Termination Of Dad’s Parental Rights, Directs Appeals Court To Reconsider Arguments

The Michigan Supreme Court has vacated a Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the termination of a father’s parental rights, sending the case back to the appeals court for reconsideration after the father files a supplemental brief.

Earlier this year, the Court of Appeals ruled in In re Gullett/Ripley, Minors (Docket No. 369084) that the Ingham County trial court correctly terminated the respondent-father’s parental rights. That decision was appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.

In his appeal, the respondent-father argued it was not in the best interests of the children to terminate his parental rights. To support this argument, he asserted the Ingham County Circuit Court did not place enough weight on the bond he had with the children and did not adequately consider that 1) he had completed portions of his case service plan and 2) one of the children had been placed with a relative.

In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court issued an order (Docket No. 168192) “vacat[ing] that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the termination of the respondent father’s parental rights to the children and remand[ing] this case to that court for reconsideration.” On remand, “the Court of Appeals shall allow the respondent to file a supplemental brief and consider the claims raised in that brief.”

All the MSC justices except Justice Noah P. Hood agreed to issuing the order. Justice Hood did not participate in the decision because he was on the panel that issued the Court of Appeals opinion in the case.

Background

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition for temporary custody of the respondents’ children, JG, CR and KG. The petition was filed pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) (failure to provide proper care and custody due to neglect or abandonment and unfit home environment due to neglect). The Ingham County trial court took jurisdiction over the children and the respondents were ordered to complete a case service plan.

In June 2022, JHG was born and the respondent-mother tested positive for cocaine during that pregnancy. Accordingly, the DHHS filed a petition for temporary custody of JHG under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and MCL 712A.2(b)(4) (failure to comply with a court-structured plan). The trial court assumed jurisdiction over JHG. Meanwhile, CR was placed with a relative and the three other children were placed in separate foster homes.

The trial court conducted a joint termination of parental rights and best-interest hearing in September 2023. The respondent-mother was not present because she had checked herself into a hospital. The respondent-father testified at the hearing and, according to the Court of Appeals opinion, “downplayed respondent-mother’s substantial history of substance abuse, including using cocaine during her pregnancies” and “denied that he used cocaine after testing positive for it in the month before the termination hearing.” Moreover, “[h]e blamed his positive screening on handling money with traces of cocaine residue.” In addition, JG, CR and KG “demonstrated severe developmental delays” and the respondent-father “did not know what services” the children received and “denied that CR and KG displayed traits of autism or developmental delays.”

The trial court terminated the respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j), finding it was in the children’s best interests. Among other things, the trial court noted the respondent-father “had made some improvements, but he lacked insight to respondent-mother’s limitations” and indicated the trial court “was no closer to returning the children to respondents” than when the case was initially opened. Further, the trial court found “by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable likelihood that the children would be harmed if returned to respondents’ care because of their substance abuse, lack of parenting skills, and emotional instability.”

Regarding the children’s best interests, the trial court held that, despite their bond with the respondents and the fact that one child had been placed with a relative, “the children needed stability and permanence.” According to the trial court, the bond between the parents and children “had suffered because of the continued substance abuse and respondents still lacked parenting skills. The children were having all … their needs met in their placement homes, where each would be adopted.” The trial court also observed that “while a child being placed with a relative typically weighs against termination, the relative in question does not speak with either respondent because of threats made by respondent-father.” As a result, the trial court held it was in the children’s best interests to terminate the respondents’ parental rights.

Court Of Appeals Opinion

Both respondents (father and mother) appealed the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights. The Court of Appeals, in its January 2025 opinion, pointed out “neither party dispute[d] that the grounds for termination of parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to all four children ….” Rather, it was argued the trial court erroneously held that termination was in the children’s best interests.

“We disagree,” the Court of Appeals said in its unpublished opinion. Then-Court of Appeals Judge Noah P. Hood and Judges James Robert Redford and Allie Greenleaf Maldonado were on the panel that issued the decision.

“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made,” the Court of Appeals said, citing MCL 712A.19b(5). “In making its determination, the trial court should weigh all of the evidence available to it and may consider the following: [T]he child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home. Other considerations include the length of time the child was in care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to her parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all, and compliance with the case service plan. …”

The Court of Appeals also pointed out the focus of a best-interest hearing is on the child, not the parent. “Moreover, ‘[a] child’s placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is required to consider.’ … While placement with a relative weighs against termination, it is not dispositive because a trial court “may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests.”

In his appeal (Docket No. 369084), the respondent-father asserted it was “not in the children’s best interests to terminate his parental rights because the trial court did not place enough weight on the bond he had with the children or that he had completed portions of his case service plan, and because one of the children was placed with a relative,” the Court of Appeals said. “After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its best interest analysis.”

Focusing on the respondent-father’s arguments, the Court of Appeals explained that, when weighing the best-interest factors, “the trial court acknowledged that CR was in a relative placement, a factor that weighed against termination.” Therefore, the trial court “adequately considered CR’s relative placement and concluded that this factor did not outweigh the factors favoring termination of respondent-father’s parental rights.”

In addition, the trial court considered that the respondent-father “had a bond with the children” but said the bond “was diminished by his unavailability arising from drug use,” the Court of Appeals noted. “Respondent-father’s continued drug use demonstrated that he did not benefit from his case service plan. Critically, respondent-father’s substance abuse diminished his parenting skills. Several of the children had severe developmental delays that required elevated supervision and care that could not be provided by intoxicated parents.”

Further, the trial court explained that “one overriding factor weighing in favor of termination was respondent-father’s lack of parenting skills,” the Court of Appeals said. “The record supports the trial court’s finding. … The trial court afforded respondent-father approximately two years to make meaningful, consistent progress in his case service plan, but he failed to demonstrate meaningful progress in his parenting ability.”

Meanwhile, “[t]o respondent-father’s credit, he and respondent-mother moved into a house that the DHHS deemed appropriate for the children,” the Court of Appeals observed. “However, respondent-father did not otherwise demonstrate improved parenting ability. … Respondent-father also consistently engaged in aggressive and hostile emotional outbursts. … His persistent aggressive behavior demonstrated that he had difficulty restraining his intense, unstable emotions. This posed a risk to the children. Moreover, despite service providers and educators indicating that JG, CR, and KG all exhibited traits of autistic children and were developmentally delayed, respondent-father only acknowledged that JG was autistic. The record supports that respondent-father lacked the parenting skills necessary to care for his children with severe developmental delays.”

The children’s “need for stability, permanency, and finality weighed in favor of termination,” the Court of Appeals stated. “The children resided with respective foster and relative placements who wished to adopt them. JG, CR, and KG were in their respective placements for two years, while JHG had been in foster care for his whole life. Each child was doing well in their respective placements. These placements offered each child stability, permanency, and finality that respondent-father could not offer.”

Accordingly, “the trial court did not clearly err when it found that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in each of the children’s best interests,” the Court of Appeals held. “The trial court properly weighed the appropriate factors … and a preponderance of the evidence weighed in favor of terminating respondent-father’s parental rights.”

Post-MSC Order Events

Since the Michigan Supreme Court’s directive that the termination order be vacated and the case be remanded, the Court of Appeals has issued several orders.

In an order dated September 2, 2025, the Court of Appeals stated: “On the Court’s own motion, pursuant to order of our Supreme Court, respondent may file a supplemental brief, which shall be limited to 25 pages. The supplemental brief shall be filed within 28 days of the Clerk’s certification of this order. A responsive brief, limited to 25 pages, may be filed within 14 days of the proof of service of the supplemental brief. No reply brief may be filed.”

The Court of Appeals issued a second order dated September 2, 2025, in which it vacated its March 5, 2024 order “consolidating this appeal with Docket No. 369082” [the respondent-mother’s case].

Also, in an order dated September 9, 2025, the Court of Appeals permitted the respondent-father to exceed the 25-page limit for his supplemental brief, and directed that the brief “shall not exceed 35 pages.

The Speaker Law Firm is following the developments in this termination of parental rights case. Stay with our blog for updates.