No Immunity For WV Judge Who Led Warrantless Search Of Litigant’s Home

A West Virginia family court judge was not entitled to judicial immunity after she paused a court hearing to go personally participate in a warrantless search of a litigant’s home, the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled.

In Gibson v Goldston (Docket No. 22-1757) plaintiff-Matthew Gibson was a party in a divorce proceeding before Raleigh County Family Court Judge Louise E. Goldston. At a March 4, 2020, hearing, Goldston stopped the proceedings and asked the plaintiff for his address. She then ordered the plaintiff (who was representing himself), his ex-wife, her attorney and police officers to meet at the plaintiff’s home. Goldston indicated that she was looking for items the plaintiff had failed to turn over to his ex-wife after the divorce. Goldston reportedly entered the plaintiff’s home over his objections and threatened him with arrest if he tried to stop her. Goldston then supervised the seizure of designated items in the plaintiff’s house.

The warrantless search prompted a series of legal proceedings and disciplinary actions against Goldston. The disciplinary proceedings ended when the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals censured Goldston for her “serious misconduct” and ordered her to pay a $1,000 fine. Goldston retired from the bench in early 2023.

The plaintiff sued Goldston in federal district court, claiming the warrantless search and seizure of his property violated the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. He also alleged the restrictions that Goldston placed on his recording the incident violated the First Amendment and that her practice of conducting “home visits” violated the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42 USC §1983, attorney fees, and injunctive and declaratory relief. Goldston filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming she was entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

U.S. District Court Judge Frank Volk denied Goldston’s motion for summary judgment, finding the search and seizure were nonjudicial acts to which judicial immunity did not attach. Goldston appealed that decision to the 4th Circuit.

The 4th Circuit affirmed the federal district court’s ruling. Judge Harvie Wilkinson III wrote for the court, agreeing that Goldston “stepp[ed] outside her judicial role” by personally searching the plaintiff’s home.

“The search of someone’s home and the seizure of its contents are executive acts, not judicial ones,” the 4th Circuit said. “We thus hold that her activities are not eligible for protections of judicial immunity.”

Judge Roger L. Gregory and Senior Judge Diana Gribbon Motz joined the opinion.  

‘Strong Medicine’

In its 15-page opinion, the 4th Circuit said the only question before it was whether judicial immunity protected the judge’s acts. “We hold it does not,” the appellate panel said. “Judicial immunity protects only judicial acts. It does not shield the conduct of judges who step outside their judicial role, as Judge Goldston did when searching [the plaintiff’s] home.”

Judicial immunity is “strong medicine” and when it applies, “it is absolute,” the 4th Circuit explained. “It not only protects judges from ultimate liability in a case, but also serves as a complete bar to suit.” According to the panel, “the medicine’s potency cautions against its indiscriminate prescription. And so there are limitations. Judicial immunity does not protect judges so much as it protects the judicial acts they undertake as part of their public service; it is ‘defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.’”

In this case, the 4th Circuit said it rested its holding that Goldston was not protected by judicial immunity on the fact that she engaged in a nonjudicial act. “Our decision is not grounded in any absence of jurisdiction. Rather, it is based on the fact that the judge clearly exceeded the most common understandings of the proper judicial role.”

The 4th Circuit specifically rejected Goldston’s argument that she was entitled to judicial immunity because she went to the plaintiff’s home intending to resolve a family court matter that was pending before her and “acted as a judge throughout the proceedings.”

Goldston “urges us to see this as a case of ‘a power lawfully possessed wrongly exercised’ … and thus to swathe her actions in judicial immunity’s embrace,” the 4th Circuit observed. “We decline to do so. Judge Goldston can enjoy such protection only when engaged in a judicial act within her jurisdiction. But Judge Goldston stepped outside of her judicial role when she personally participated in the search of [the plaintiff’s] home. The search of someone’s home and the seizure of its contents are executive acts, not judicial ones. We thus hold that her activities are not eligible for the protections of judicial immunity.”

Moreover, it is “basic to our system” that the person who issues the order is not the one who enforces it, the 4th Circuit noted. “This basic paradigm was violated and compromised by Judge Goldston’s actions. She stepped out of the judicial role in a variety of ways, which made plain in combination that she was engaged in an extrajudicial function.”

It was “clear” that Goldston “engaged in acts not normally performed by judges and in so doing forfeited the protection of judicial immunity,” the 4th Circuit stated. “Judge Goldston’s actions instead marked her out as part of the law enforcement team. … More than just participate, Judge Goldston supervised the whole operation. She controlled the scope of both the search and the seizure. … Searches, seizures, and their supervision are classic law enforcement functions reserved for the executive branch. … While Judge Goldston might have had the authority to order a search, … the proper authority to conduct the operation was the local sheriff’s department or some other appropriate law enforcement agency.”

In conclusion, “judges should not take law enforcement into their own hands, no matter the efficiencies such usurpation might provide,” the 4th Circuit held. “While the principles that undergird our holding are broad, the holding itself is narrow. It is governed by the facts revealed by the record. We do not decide whether Judge Goldston might be entitled to some other type of immunity for the search and seizure complained of in Gibson’s suit. We hold only that on these facts judicial immunity plainly will not lie.”