Split Court Of Appeals Affirms Parental Rights Termination, Dissent Says ‘Mistake’ Was Made

The trial court in this termination of parental rights case correctly held that it was in the minor child’s best interests to terminate the respondent-father’s parental rights, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled in a 2-1 decision.

The respondent-father in In re J. L. Crumbey, Minor (Docket No. 372280) had reportedly sexually abused the half-sister of his minor child, JC. The Wayne County Circuit Court found statutory grounds to take jurisdiction over JC, as well as his older half-brother, CC.  The trial court also found statutory grounds to terminate the respondent’s parental rights to both children.

At the time of the termination hearing, CC was 17 years old. After testifying that he did not want the respondent’s parental rights to him to be terminated, the trial court ruled it was not in CC’s best interests to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. Meanwhile, JC was 7 years old at the time of the hearing, was living with his half-sister, his half-brother and his mother, and was unaware the respondent had sexually abused his half-sister. JC’s mother testified that contact between the respondent and JC caused “friction” in the household because JC’s half-sister “felt isolated when everyone would go to visit” the respondent and JC would question why his half-sister “did not go with them on the visits.” Although JC’s mother indicated that she would not keep the respondent from having contact with JC if the court did not terminate his parental rights, she emphasized that it was “a difficult situation given that the respondent had sexually abused JC’s half-sister with whom JC was living.”

Based on the testimony presented, the Wayne County trial court found it was in JC’s best interests to terminate the respondent’s parental rights to him. The respondent appealed, arguing the trial court erred by not conducting an individualized best interests evaluation for JC. The respondent also maintained that CC was similarly situated to JC in “every respect except for his age.”

The Court of Appeals disagreed in a split decision that affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

“[I]t is clear that the trial court took an individual approach to determining whether termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest,” the Court of Appeals said in a majority opinion joined by Judge Michael J. Kelly and Judge Michael J. Riordan. “The trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous.”

Judge Allie Greenleaf Maldonado dissented, saying she was “left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.”

‘Civil Death Penalty’ 

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals majority concluded the trial court considered the best interests of JC and CC separately and, in doing so, it recognized that both children “had a strong bond” with the respondent.

“However,” the majority said, “CC was almost 18 years of age, but JC was only 7 years old. CC was made aware that respondent had sexually abused JC’s half-sister and he was old enough to make his own determination as to what level of contact he wished to maintain with respondent.  … Further, although [JC] had a bond with respondent, given his age and lack of awareness of respondent’s sexual abuse, the trial court did not err by not inquiring into his preference.”

In addition, the Court of Appeals majority said the only similarity in living arrangements was that the children were both living with their mothers and not the respondent. “JC was living with his half-sister, the child that respondent had sexually abused. Thus, in JC’s case, a relevant consideration was the impact that continued contact between JC and respondent would have on the family dynamic. … The court found that the negative impact on the family dynamic weighed in favor of finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in JC’s best interests.”

The Court of Appeals majority concluded it was “clear” the trial court “took an individual approach to determining whether termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. It found that, given the differences in the children’s ages and living situations, it was in JC’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights, but that it was not in CC’s best interests to do so. The trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous.”

Judge Maldonado disagreed with the majority opinion, noting that Michigan does not have a process by which a parent can seek to have parental rights reinstated. “Accordingly, in this state, termination of parental rights could be properly characterized as tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty,” she said, citing In re Bates, Minors, 514 Mich 862 (2024).

The judge also pointed in her dissenting opinion that JC and the respondent have a “strong bond” with the respondent that was “amply supported” by the record. “Terminating respondent’s parental rights, therefore, would result in instability in JC’s life as it would remove a bonded figure from his accustomed weekly routine.” And in light of the evidence of a strong bond, “the trial court had to determine that there were even stronger reasons in JC’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights,” she stated.

“[I]n my view,” Judge Maldonado continued, “the trial court failed to conduct an individualized determination of JC’s best interests. Rather, the trial court concerned itself with how the allegations against respondent affected other members of JC’s family. For instance, the trial court credited the testimony of JC’s mother that ‘things are very difficult’ for her and that she was ‘having a tough time keeping this family going and keeping things together’ while trying not to tell JC ‘what went on.’ Likewise, the trial court conflated JC’s interests with those of his half-sister. The trial court worried that JC’s half-sister would be ‘uneasy’ around him if he remained in contact with respondent. Thus, the trial court ordered termination to ‘let [JC] and his family … move on.’”

While Judge Maldonado agreed the trial court could consider how the respondent’s continued relationship with JC impacted the family dynamic, “the focus should have been on JC,” she emphasized. “To that end, the DHHS [Department of Health and Human Services] did not present evidence that the stress on other family members also created stress for JC, such as through testimony from a mental health professional, JC’s mother, or JC himself. In other words, the trial court’s concerns for JC’s stability and mental health are based on assumptions regarding the record testimony – the trial court jumped to the conclusion that the stress on the family was negatively impacting JC.”

Further, Judge Maldonado noted that JC’s mother testified she would not deny visits with the respondent because she believed it is best for JC to have a relationship with him. “Therefore, the trial court could have left it up to JC’s mother to continue to balance JC’s best interests with those of the rest of the family. This approach would have retained respondent’s parental rights, while giving JC’s mother full discretion over his contact with respondent.”

In conclusion, Judge Maldonado said: “I do not think that it is too much to ask that, when weighing something that has been compared to a ‘death penalty,’ we take the time and resources needed to truly evaluate what is in a child’s best interest. On this record, I do not believe that a preponderance of the evidence supported that termination was in JC’s best interests. … To the contrary, I am left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.  … Accordingly, I dissent.”