Appeals Court: ‘Address’ In Open Meetings Act Means Both Oral And Written Communications

The right to “address” a public body under the Open Meetings Act can be satisfied through both oral and written submissions, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.

In Michigan Open Carry, Inc. v Michigan House of Representatives and Senate (Docket No. 368942), the plaintiffs-advocacy groups challenged the trial court’s decision to dismiss their lawsuit against the defendants-House of Representatives and Senate (i.e., the Legislature). In their suit, the plaintiffs claimed the Legislature violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261, et seq., at various House and Senate committee meetings when several group members were allegedly unable to testify in opposition to firearms legislation.

The plaintiffs asked the trial court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants responded by filing a motion for summary disposition. The trial court granted summary disposition for the defendants, finding the right to “address” a public body under MCL 15.263(5) can be satisfied through both oral and written submissions.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in a decision that focused on the meaning of the word “address” in the OMA.

“In the absence of any evidence that the Legislature intended a particular definition for the word ‘address’ in MCL 15.263(5), or evidence that the word has become a legal term of art, or evidence that defining the word to include written communication would be at odds with the purposes of the OMA, we see no reason why the word should not be given its plain and ordinary meaning,” Judge Mark T. Boonstra wrote for the appeals court. “We therefore affirm the trial court’s interpretation of MCL 15.263(5).”

Judge Anica Letica and Judge Michelle M. Rick joined the published and binding opinion.

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals emphasized it was not holding that a public body complies with the OMA by accepting only written submissions. “A public body’s rules regarding the acceptance of written communications and limitation of oral communications should, if challenged, be reviewed in the manner of any other challenge under the OMA.”

Rather, “[w]e merely decline plaintiffs’ request to interpret MCL 15.263(5) in a manner that would, in all circumstances, preclude the acceptance of written communications in lieu of oral communications, or that at least would preclude a court from considering that acceptance when analyzing a challenge to a public body under the OMA,” the Court of Appeals said.

Lower Court Rationale

The trial court decided the defendants’ motion for summary disposition without oral argument and issued a written opinion and order. The trial court held the Senate did not violate the OMA and that, while the House failed to enact sufficient rules regarding the right to address committees and violated the OMA, injunctive relief was not warranted. The trial court’s decision was based partly on its finding that the rules allowing committees to accept written testimony satisfied the OMA because the Legislature’s use of the word “address” – which is not defined in the OMA – included both oral and written communications.

The trial court reasoned:

“The OMA does not define the term ‘address.’ ‘[W]hen a statute does not define words contained within it, we must construe and understand them according to the common and approved usage of our language.’ …  To determine the common meaning of a word, courts may consult dictionary definitions. … Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed), p 14, defines the term ‘address’ as ‘to communicate directly … to speak or write directly to[.]’ Reviewing these definitions in the context of MCL 15.263(5), it becomes apparent that the Legislature intended to allow the public’s right to address public bodies under the OMA to be satisfied through oral and written submissions. Although oral submissions may be preferred by members of the public, the ability to present written submissions in lieu of oral submissions is a pragmatic alternative when public bodies have a duty to carry out their public duties under time constraints, and a large number of individuals are present at a public hearing and their desire to speak presents an obstacle to the public body fulfilling its duties. [Emphasis in original.]”

The plaintiffs appealed, “solely challeng[ing] the trial court’s construction of the word ‘address’ in MCL 15.263(5).”

Meaning Of ‘Address’

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued the trial court erroneously held that the right to “address” a public body under MCL 15.263(5) can be satisfied through oral and written submissions.

“We disagree,” the Court of Appeals said, noting that MCL 15.263(5) says, “A person must be permitted to address a meeting of a public body under rules established and recorded by the public body. The legislature or a house of the legislature may provide by rule that the right to address may be limited to prescribed times at hearings and committee meetings only.”

The Court of Appeals pointed out the OMA’s purpose is to provide “openness and accountability” in government. “This Court has held that MCL 15.263(5) reflects the Legislature’s intent ‘to grant public bodies the authority to establish and enforce rules regarding public comment, as well as the ability to establish and enforce similar rules during hearings and committee reports.’”

The “sole issue” in the present case was “whether the trial court erred by deciding that ‘the Legislature intended to allow the public’s right to address public bodies under the OMA to be satisfied through oral and written submissions,’” the Court of Appeals said. “We conclude that it did not.”

The Court of Appeals continued by noting it was “important to frame the issue” and pinpoint what the trial court did not decide and what was not at issue on appeal. “Contrary to plaintiffs’ characterization, the trial court did not decide that a public body complies with the OMA if it limits the public to written addresses only. That issue was not before the court, as neither the House nor the Senate Judiciary Committee allowed only written communication from the public at its meetings.”

Here, the record showed the public “was permitted to request to address the committees orally, submit a written statement, both, or neither – the testimony cards permit meeting attendees to check a box indicating whether they wish to speak and direct attendees to ‘leave a copy of any prepared statement with the committee clerk,’” the Court of Appeals observed. Neither the plaintiffs, nor the public at large, were “limited to providing only written testimony as the means of addressing the meeting,” the appeals court said. “[T]he trial court’s interpretation of ‘address’ as used in MCL 15.263(5) was only a part of its larger analysis concerning the adequacy and implementation of the rules promulgated by the committees regarding the public’s right to address committee meetings.”

Moreover, the plaintiffs’ challenge “is solely to the trial court’s interpretation of the term ‘address’ in MCL 15.263(5),” the Court of Appeals emphasized. Therefore, “[t]he issue before us is thus purely one of statutory interpretation: the meaning of the word ‘address’ in MCL 15.263(5).”

The Court of Appeals pointed out the Legislature did not define the term “address” in the OMA. “When the Legislature has not defined a term, its ordinary meaning is used when construing a statute. … Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary provides that the verb ‘address’ may be defined as ‘to communicate directly’ and ‘to speak or write directly to’ especially regarding a formal communication. … The ordinary meaning of the word therefore encompasses written communication in addition to speech.”

However, the plaintiffs maintained the dictionary definition of “address” should not apply because “it was ‘plainly understood by everyone involved’ that public address under MCL 15.263(5) means only oral address by members of the public present at the meeting,” the Court of Appeals noted. “Plaintiffs essentially argue that the word ‘address’ in the statute has acquired a particular technical meaning or has become a term of art. … But plaintiffs provide no legal support for that assertion, and we find it generally unpersuasive.”

The plaintiffs’ also argued that when the Legislature amended the OMA in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, this was an indication that it “understood the word ‘address’ to refer ‘only to oral address.’” The Court of Appeals disagreed, saying the Legislature “merely added a provision to the OMA governing the conduct of electronic meetings. … MCL 15.263a(2) provides guidance for a public body seeking to permit oral public comment at an electronic meeting. We decline to read this provision as proof of the Legislature’s intent when interpreting a different statutory provision that was enacted decades earlier.”

Based on the foregoing, “we see no reason why the word should not be given its plain and ordinary meaning,” the Court of Appeals stated. “We therefore affirm the trial court’s interpretation of MCL 15.263(5).”