COA Holds That Signing Release Of Parental Rights Does Not Preclude Right To Appeal
Opinion Published: May 6, 2025 (Gadola, Wallace, Ackerman)
Docket No. 372145
Kent County Circuit Court
Holding: When a parent challenges the validity of a release of parental rights on the ground that it was not made knowingly or voluntarily, the parent alleges a concrete injury arising from the trial court’s order and qualifies as an aggrieved party for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.
Facts: DHHS petitioned to remove Respondent-Mother’s two children from her care in November 2022 based on allegations of substance abuse, mental health challenges, housing instability, and the children witnessing Respondent-Mother being abused by her boyfriend. Respondent-Mother pled to the allegations in the petition at adjudication and Respondent-Mother was offered reunification services. After almost two years of inconsistent participation in services, Respondent-Mother submitted a written release of her parental rights to the Trial Court in June 2024. The Trial Court accepted Respondent-Mother’s release and entered an order terminating her parental rights.
Respondent-Mother subsequently appealed that order to the Court of Appeals, arguing that her release was not knowing and voluntary. In response to Respondent-Mother’s appeal, DHHS argued Respondent-Mother was not an “aggrieved party” due to having consented to the termination, and thus, DHHS argued that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over Respondent-Mother’s appeal.
Key Appellate Rulings:
When challenging the validity of the release itself, a respondent parent is an “aggrieved party” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals noted that several unpublished decisions of the Court of Appeals had previously dealt with this question in a conflicting manner. The panel noted DHHS was citing to In re Sheridan, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 21, 2020 (Docket No. 351263), and that line of unpublished cases, which held that a release of parental rights was akin to a consent judgment and therefore any respondent who signs a release is not an aggrieved party for purposes of appeal. On the other hand, the panel also noted a different line of cases beginning with In re Jackson/Jenkins/Jones, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 20, 2018 (Docket Nos. 343224 and 344359), which held that a respondent parent could be an aggrieved party for purposes of appeal when the respondent parent was challenging the validity of their plea. The panel was more persuaded by the Jackson case than the Sheridan case and held that “in a termination of parental rights proceeding, a respondent who released their parental rights is an aggrieved party under MCR 7.203(A) when challenging the validity of the release itself.” The panel further reasoned that, in line with Jackson, “even if an order terminating parental rights based on a release is analogous to a consent judgment, it does not necessarily follow that respondent is precluded from appealing from it. Because the termination here was based on a release respondent now claims was defective, we reject the DHHS’s argument that the release deprives this Court of jurisdiction under MCR 7.203(A).”
Applying this to the facts of this matter, the panel concluded that Respondent-Mother’s release was knowing and voluntary and thus affirmed the Trial Court’s order terminating Respondent-Mother’s parental rights.
