Appeals Court Denies Request to Vacate Published Opinion on Domestic Relations Attorney Fee Order
A trial court’s postjudgment order awarding attorney fees under MCR 3.206 for the defendant’s alleged noncompliance with an order in her divorce case “constitutes a form of compensatory civil contempt” and “is not a final order appealable of right,” the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled, dismissing the defendant’s appeal.
In Uddin v Mukarram (Docket No. 377981), the parties’ judgment of divorce required them to file a joint 2024 tax return. On October 8, 2025, the Oakland County Circuit Court ordered the defendant to “cooperate with [the] parties’ tax preparer that they used during the marriage … to immediately sign and file the parties’ taxes with the IRS” and also authorized the plaintiff to file separately if the defendant did not comply. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $1,500 in attorney fees and costs pursuant to MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b). That court rule says that, in a domestic relations action, a court may award attorney fees if “the attorney fees and expenses were incurred because the other party refused to comply with a previous court order, despite having the ability to comply.”
The defendant appealed the trial court’s order. After the Court of Appeals held oral arguments, it ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on whether Alpena County Board of County Road Commissioners v Tadajewski, ___ Mich App ___ (2025) (Docket No. 374166), applies to an attorney fee award under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b). The Court of Appeals also invited the State Bar of Michigan Family Law Section and the State Bar of Michigan Appellate Practice Section to file amicus briefs on the issue.
Shortly after, the Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant’s appeal in a published and binding opinion. “Because an award under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) for noncompliance with a court order constitutes a form of compensatory civil contempt, it falls within the rule articulated in Tadajewski,” the Court of Appeals wrote. The attorney fee award “is therefore not appealable of right, and defendant’s remaining claims are likewise jurisdictionally defective.” Judges Matthew S. Ackerman, Stephen L. Borrello and Michael J. Kelly were on the panel that issued the decision.
The Court of Appeals, however, issued its opinion prior to the Family Law Section submitting its amicus brief. Meanwhile, the defendant also filed a motion for the Court of Appeals to reconsider its opinion. In its amicus brief, the Family Law Section told the Court of Appeals that it “supported” the motion for reconsideration because the defendant’s argument “is consistent with the position the Section voted to take prior to the issuance of the Court of Appeals opinion.”
In the Family Law Section’s amicus brief, the Section said that, in reaching its conclusion, “the Court [of Appeals] fundamentally altered the jurisdictional framework established by the Michigan Supreme Court and … has hereby created a future jurisdictional trap for family law attorneys seeking appellate relief under MCR 3.206(D).”
On August 5, 2026, the Court of Appeals issued an order denying the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, thereby effectively rejecting the Family Law Section’s position.
Court Of Appeals Decision
In its published opinion dismissing the defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals addressed the defendant’s claims that the trial court erroneously 1) awarded the plaintiff attorney fees, 2) required the parties to file a joint tax return and 3) required her to cooperate with the plaintiff’s tax preparer.
Regarding the order awarding attorney fees, the defendant “presumably relies on this Court’s jurisdiction to review ‘a postjudgment order awarding … attorney fees and costs under court rule or other law,’” the Court of Appeals said, citing MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv). “We conclude that we lack jurisdiction under Tadajewski.” According to the appeals court, the plaintiff’s motion to compel invoked MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) because the record was “clear” the trial court relied on that rule. Moreover, although this court rule “does not explicitly use the term ‘contempt,’ it unmistakably implements the court’s contempt power.”
Further, MCL 600.1701(g) provides that a court may punish “’[p]arties to actions … for disobeying any lawful order, decree, or process of the court’ as contempt,” the Court of Appeals noted. “This Court has repeatedly interpreted the court rule as implementing that statutory authority. Such compensation may include attorney fees as part of the damages awarded. … That is precisely what MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) contemplates when it authorizes an award of ‘attorney fees and expenses’ that have been ‘incurred because the other party refused to comply with a previous court order.’”
Looking to its decision in Tadajewski, the Court of Appeals said the appellate panel in that case held that an order of compensatory civil contempt “is not a final order appealable of right.” And even though the trial court in Tadajewski “relied directly on MCL 600.1721” and the trial court in the present case relied on MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b), “that distinction is immaterial – the court rule implements the same statutory contempt authority.”
Any challenge to the attorney fee award “had to be brought by application for leave to appeal from ‘a judgment or order of the circuit court … that is not a final judgment appealable of right,’” the Court of Appeals said, citing MCR 7.203(B)(1). “Because an award under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) for noncompliance with a court order constitutes a form of compensatory civil contempt under MCL 600.1721, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review it in an appeal of right.”
Next, the Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant’s arguments relating to the filing of a joint tax return and hiring a tax preparer.
Regarding the joint tax return, the Court of Appeals noted the trial court’s order was part of the July 23, 2025 judgment of divorce. “That judgment was a final order appealable of right. … Defendant, however, does not appeal from that judgment. Instead, she appeals from the trial court’s October 8 order resolving plaintiff’s motion to compel after the parties were unable to agree on finalizing the required tax return. An appeal from the October 8 order is not a vehicle to collaterally attack the earlier July 23 final judgment.”
As to the tax preparer, the defendant asserted the trial court’s order was basically a “modification” of the divorce judgment that “was outside the scope of a post judgment motion to compel,” the Court of Appeals observed. “Under MCR 7.203(A)(1), this Court has jurisdiction over an appeal of right from ‘[a] final judgment or final order of the circuit court … as defined in MCR 7.202(6).’ Defendant did not specify which definition confers jurisdiction in the jurisdictional checklist she submitted under MCR 7.204(C)(6).”
According to the Court of Appeals, “[o]nly three definitions could plausibly apply. The first is the general definition of a final judgment in a civil case: ‘the first judgment or order that disposes of all the claims and adjudicates the rights and liabilities of all the parties.’ … The October 8 order does not fall within this definition. As noted, the July 23 judgment of divorce served that function.”
A second possibility, the Court of Appeals observed, is MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii). This rule says that, “’in a domestic relations action, a postjudgment order that, as to a minor, grants or denies a motion to change legal custody, physical custody, or domicile’ constitutes a ‘final judgment.’ Although this is a domestic relations action, the order at issue was not entered in response to ‘a motion to change legal custody, physical custody, or domicile’ of a minor.”
A third possibility, the Court of Appeals continued, is MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv). This rule “gives this Court jurisdiction to review ‘a postjudgment order awarding … attorney fees and costs under court rule or other law.’ … Under MCR 7.203(A)(1), however, ‘[a]n appeal from an order described in MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii)-(iv) is limited to the portion of the order with respect to which there is an appeal of right.’ Thus, ‘any issue outside those challenging the award of attorney fees goes beyond our jurisdiction over these appeals.’ … [The defendant’s] appeal of the award of attorney fees is not a vehicle by which this Court can review other aspects of the trial court’s decision.”
Therefore, “[a]ny challenge to this aspect of the trial court’s October 8 order … had to be brought by application as an appeal from ‘a judgment or order of the circuit court … that is not a final judgment appealable of right,’” the Court of Appeals said.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals stated: “Although the reasons differ, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review each of defendant’s issues on appeal. Defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s order requiring the parties to file a joint tax return seeks review of the July 23 judgment of divorce through an appeal from the October 8 order resolving plaintiff’s motion to compel; such review is not permitted. Defendant’s challenges to the order requiring her to cooperate with plaintiff’s tax preparer and to the award of attorney fees do not fall within the definition of a ‘final judgment’ under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i), (iii), or (iv), and therefore likewise fall outside this Court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”
Family Law Section Position
In its amicus brief, the Family Law Section told the Court of Appeals that its ruling “effectively narrows MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv) by reclassifying an attorney fee award under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) as a contempt order rather than a final post-judgment attorney fee order expressly identified by the Michigan Supreme Court as appealable by right thereby creating a judicial exception not found in the rules' text and causing a jurisdictional trap for family law practitioners.”
According to the Family Law Section, this case “presents an issue of exceptional importance” to Michigan domestic relations law. “In its published opinion, this Court held that an attorney-fee award entered pursuant to MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) – a rule under the Domestic Relations Actions chapter of the Michigan Court Rules providing grounds for attorney fees – constitutes a form of compensatory civil contempt under MCL 600.1701 and MCL 600.1721 and, therefore, is not reviewable by appeal of right under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv).”
In its decision, the Court of Appeals “conflates attorney fee appeals brought under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) and MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv) with contempt proceedings,” the Family Law Section wrote. “In support, the Court points to … Tadajewski, … a case where the Circuit Court conducted formal contempt proceedings and found the Appellant to be in contempt. The Appellant in Tadajewski filed an appeal by right that this Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In contrast, in the present matter, no contempt proceedings were ever conducted. In reaching its conclusion in the present matter, the Court fundamentally altered the jurisdictional framework established by the Michigan Supreme Court and … has hereby created a future jurisdictional trap for family law attorneys seeking appellate relief under MCR 3.206(D).”
The Court of Appeals analysis “departs from settled principles governing interpretation of Michigan court rules and statutes,” the Family Law Section explained. “The proper inquiry is not whether an attorney-fee award under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) shares certain remedial characteristics with compensatory contempt. Rather, the dispositive question is how the Michigan Supreme Court has classified that order for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court answered that question when it adopted MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv). Because the order at issue is a postjudgment order awarding attorney fees under a court rule, it falls squarely within the plain language of that jurisdictional rule as it relates to the issue of attorney fees.”
Further, “[b]y treating aspects of functional similarity as controlling over the text of the Michigan Court Rules, the published opinion effectively narrows MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv) to exclude a category of attorney-fee awards that the Supreme Court itself did not exclude,” the Family Law Section wrote. “In doing so, the opinion not only conflicts with settled principles requiring courts to enforce unambiguous court rules as written but also creates unnecessary uncertainty concerning appellate jurisdiction in domestic-relations cases throughout the State.”
According to the Family Law Section, the “practical consequences” of the Court of Appeals decision “are substantial.” Based on the ruling, “every attorney confronted with an attorney-fee award under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) must first decide whether the award should be treated as an appealable post-judgment attorney-fee order or as an order of compensatory contempt. Because the opinion provides no objective standard for distinguishing one from the other, prudent practitioners will face an untenable choice: file an appeal of right and risk dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, file an application for leave and risk unnecessary expense and delay, or file both to preserve appellate rights. None of those outcomes promotes the efficient administration of justice.”
In addition, the Family Law Section said the plain language of MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv) “provides precisely the certainty and uniformity that appellate jurisdiction demands. The published opinion creates a procedural trap that deprives litigants of appellate review through uncertainty over the proper method of invoking appellate jurisdiction.”
The consequences of the Court of Appeals decision “extend far beyond the parties to this appeal” because the opinion is published, the Family Law Section explained. “Unless corrected, it will introduce uncertainty into the appellate review of domestic relations attorney-fee awards, invite jurisdictional litigation in routine post judgment proceedings, and effectively amend a jurisdictional rule promulgated by the Michigan Supreme Court. For these reasons, … the Family Law Section respectfully submits that reconsideration should be granted, the published opinion of Uddin v Mukkaram be vacated, and Defendant[’s] … appeal reinstated.”
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