Michigan Court of Appeals Rejects Anticipatory Neglect as a Basis for Terminating Parental Rights
COA Opinion Published: August 13, 2026 (Boonstra, P.J., and Young and Korobkin, JJ.)
COA Docket No. 375267
Muskegon County Circuit Court
Holding:The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court order terminating parental rights that was based primarily on the doctrine of anticipatory neglect because the evidence did not demonstrate that the child at issue was subject to the same risk of harm as the other child who had been abused by the parent 8 years prior and under very different circumstances.
Facts: The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition asking the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over CP, remove him from respondent’s care, and her terminate parental rights.
Previously respondent was convicted of child sexual abuse of her infant son and sentenced to prison, placed on the sex offender registry, and voluntarily released her parental rights to the child, MP. Evidence suggested that respondent had been a victim of sex trafficking which played a role in the acts against MP, and expert testimony explained she met the legal definition of a human trafficking victim at the time of the acts.
After being released from prison and demonstrating respondent had changed her circumstances by showing major growth, had a support system in place, and lived in a recovery home for victims of human trafficking, respondent gave birth to another son, CP. CPS removed the infant from her care at the hospital due to her prior criminal history and because she did not have a home to bring him to. The trial court nevertheless assumed jurisdiction, then terminated her parental rights to her infant son CP.
Key Appellate Holdings:
The trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over CP under MCL 712A.2(b)(2).
The trial court took jurisdiction based on the ground that respondent’s home was an unfit place for the child to live based on neglect. Respondent gave statements to CPS that established a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the petition was filed, respondent was unable to provide a home for CP and unable to provide proper care and custody for this child. With respondent failing to be able to provide a fit place for the child to live, the trial court did not err by finding it had jurisdiction over CP.
The trial court’s findings for termination under MCL 712.A.19b(3)(g) was insufficient.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) outlines proper care and custody and requires proof showing the parent failed to provide proper care or custody and that there is no reasonable expectation the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time. Although the trial court agreed that at the time of trial, respondent could not immediately provide housing for CP, they failed to prove that there was no reasonable expectation she could within a reasonable time. Respondent had stable employment, access to resources to help her obtain independent housing, and with no witness testimony providing evidence she could not obtain housing within a reasonable time, the Court of Appeals held that this was not established by clear and convincing evidence.
The trial court’s findings for termination under MCL 712.A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (j), and (k)(ii) were insufficient.
The other statutory grounds addressed the issue of whether it can be proven by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child would suffer from abuse in the future, or harmed if returned to respondent’s care. These grounds were based on respondent’s sexual abuse of her other son 8 years prior when he was an infant and anticipating that CP would also be subject to sex abuse. It was recognized that how a parent treats one child can be indicative of how they might treat another child, but the Court of Appeals emphasized that this evidence is probative, not conclusive. The Court of Appeals said there was clear error in the trial court treating respondent’s previous abuse as grounds for terminating her parental rights in a new case when there had been many positive changes in respondent’s life in the past 8 years, and when the circumstances that led to her abuse of MP no longer existed (as she was no longer a human trafficking victim who was subject to the coercion of her abuser). There were many other facts in the record that demonstrated that CP would not be exposed to the same risk of harm that existed when MP was an infant.
