Appeals Court Rejects Broad Application Of COVID Lawsuit Regulations: Medical Negligence Claims Revived
The trial court wrongly dismissed the plaintiff’s medical malpractice and negligence claims that arose during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic because the decedent’s injuries were not sustained “by reason of” healthcare services provided “in support of [the] state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic,” the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.
In Estate of Jokinen v Beaumont Hospital-Troy (Docket No. 370983), the decedent, Shirley Jokinen, was treated by the defendants for medical issues unrelated to COVID. She died in May 2020. Her cause of death was listed as “sepsis due to infected decubitus ulcer, cardio myopathy, and CAD [coronary artery disease].” The plaintiff, as the personal representative of Shirley’s estate, subsequently filed medical malpractice and ordinary negligence claims against the defendants.
The defendants sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s lawsuit, relying on the Pandemic Health Care Immunity Act (PHCIA), MCL 691.1471 et seq., which was enacted in 2020 during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Under the PHCIA, medical negligence actions could only be filed for “willful misconduct, gross negligence, intentional and willful criminal misconduct, or intentional infliction of harm by the health care provider or health care facility.” The defendants asserted that because of the chaos that existed in the healthcare system from April through July 2020, immunity under the PHCIA should be applied broadly and extend beyond just COVID-19 cases.
The Oakland County Circuit Court granted summary disposition to the defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8), finding that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege willful misconduct, gross negligence, intentional and willful criminal misconduct, or intentional infliction of harm.
The plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court erroneously dismissed the claims against the defendants. The plaintiff asserted the PHCIA did not apply because the decedent had not been treated for COVID-19.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the trial court’s decision in a published and binding opinion. “Because we conclude that, at the pleading stage, it appears that the decedent did not sustain injury by reason of healthcare services provided in support of the State of Michigan’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, we reverse the award of summary disposition and remand the case for further proceedings.”
Judge Christopher P. Yates wrote the opinion, joined by Judge Adrienne N. Young and Judge Randy J. Wallace.
Prior Binding Decisions
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by providing an overview of the Michigan Governor’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Governor “declared a state of emergency on March 10, 2020. Executive Order No. 2020-4. A series of additional executive orders followed, including E[xecutive] O[rder] 2020-30, issued on March 29, 2020, which afforded immunity to healthcare facilities and professionals in certain circumstances ….”
This immunity was extended under Executive Order No. 2020-61, the Court of Appeals explained, but was rescinded on July 15, 2020, by Executive Order No. 2020-150. “Three months later, our Legislature codified the immunity granted in EO 2020-30 and EO 2020-61 by enacting MCL 691.1475, which mirrored the language of the executive orders ….”
Next, the Court of Appeals pointed out it has analyzed the PHCIA in two previously published opinions:
Warren [Franklin] v McLaren Flint, ___ Mich App ___ (2024) (Docket No. 366226), application for leave to appeal denied by the Michigan Supreme Court on Dec. 23, 2024 (Docket No. 167456) (Viviano, J. dissenting).
Skipper-Baines v Board of Hospital Managers for the City of Flint, ___ Mich App ___ (2024) (Docket No. 365137).
In the Warren [Franklin] case, “[t]his Court defined the inquiry as whether the services were provided ‘in support of this state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic,’ as required under MCL 691.1475,” the Court of Appeals said. “This Court also explained that this statutory immunity covered ‘both regular medical care and medical treatment specific to COVID 19.’ … Further, this Court ruled that the broad statutory language ‘demonstrates that all possible deaths or injuries are covered by the statute unless excepted.’ … Pointing out that the plaintiff ‘presented at the hospital with signs of COVID-19, was admitted to the COVID 19 floor for COVID-19 treatment, and allegedly developed pressure ulcers as a result of that care,’ this Court stated that ‘[s]uch a sequence of events is covered by the plain language of the statute.’”
In the Skipper-Baines case, summary disposition for the defendant-medical providers was reversed because “the hospital had not provided services to the decedent in support of the state’s response to the pandemic, and that the lawsuit stemmed ‘entirely from [a] beating inflicted upon the decedent by his roommate,’” the Court of Appeals explained. “This Court observed that the decedent did not contract COVID-19 until after he was hospitalized for an unrelated illness …. This Court concluded that ‘there was absolutely no connection between the alleged malpractice and the pandemic,’ so ‘there is no immunity[,]’ … despite the undisputed fact that the cause of the decedent’s death was ‘COVID-19 associated pneumonia and complications thereof complicated by hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.’”
PHCIA Does Not Bar Claims
“Applying our binding precedent, we readily conclude that defendants are not immune from liability for medical malpractice and ordinary negligence,” the Court of Appeals held. “The immunity conferred by the PHCIA in MCL 691.1475 just applies to injuries sustained ‘by reason of’ services provided by a healthcare provider or facility ‘in support of this state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.’”
Unlike the plaintiff in Warren [Frankin], the decedent in the present case “was not admitted to the hospital with symptoms of COVID-19, she was never treated for COVID-19, and there is no indication that she ever tested positive for COVID-19,” the Court of Appeals observed. “Indeed, those facts make the request for immunity here even weaker than the immunity claim that this Court rejected in Skipper-Baines, where the decedent suffered injuries unrelated to COVID-19, but subsequently contracted COVID-19 while hospitalized, and then died of the disease.”
Further, the Court of Appeals rejected the defendants’ argument that, even if the decedent developed pressure ulcers that were not properly diagnosed or treated, “that deficiency was ‘a byproduct of the very demands, restrictions, protocols, uncertainties, and overall chaos considered by the governor and the legislature.’”
The Oakland County trial court “granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), and nothing in the complaint even suggests that any factual basis for that argument exists,” the Court of Appeals said. “Because relief under MCR 2.116(C)(8) depends on nothing but the contents of the pleadings, … we cannot review evidence or factual allegations presented by defendants.”
Moreover, “if we accept defendants’ capacious approach to the immunity granted by the PHCIA in MCL 691.1475, ‘it is difficult to imagine any scenario in which a medical malpractice suit arising from acts and omissions occurring during the COVID-19 emergency could proceed,’” the Court of Appeals stated. “And as this Court astutely observed in Skipper-Baines, ‘[t]he Legislature and the Governor would not have limited the immunity conferred pursuant to this statute to services supporting the pandemic response if it actually intended for all medical providers to be immune from all liability short of gross negligence.’”
Accordingly, “we reverse the trial court’s award of summary disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and remand the case for further consideration …,” the Court of Appeals concluded.