Court of Appeals Holds That Filing a Trust Dispute as a Civil Action Does Not Create a Jurisdictional Defect
Gregg A Ecker v Karen S Ecker Nickel
Opinion Published: July 14, 2026 (Ackerman, P.J., and Redford and Feeney)
COA Docket No. 366482
Emmet Probate Court
Holding: This appeal arose from a probate dispute among siblings over administration of a family trust, filed as a civil action rather than as a probate proceeding initiated by petition. The Court of Appeals held that this filing error was procedural, not jurisdictional, and did not deprive the probate court of subject-matter jurisdiction or deny the defendant-trustee due process. Because the case proceeded as a civil action, the definition of a final order under MCR 5.801(A)(2) for probate proceedings did not apply, so the order removing the defendant as trustee was not appealable of right when entered and was reviewable in this appeal from the later final judgment. On the merits, the Court affirmed the trustee's removal, the invalidation of an unsigned trust amendment, the denial of the trustee's claims against the trust, the award of rent, and the attorney-fee rulings.
Facts: The parties are siblings and beneficiaries of a trust their parents created in 2010, which named defendant Karen Nickel as successor trustee. After the parents' deaths, plaintiffs Gregg and Scott Ecker grew concerned about Nickel's administration of the trust, including her reliance on an unsigned “First Amendment” that would have eliminated a reduction to Gregg's distributions, and her refusal to provide information. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in probate court seeking a declaration invalidating the First Amendment, Nickel's removal as trustee, and an inventory and accounting. Nickel chose not to respond, and the probate court entered a default and later a partial default judgment removing her as trustee, invalidating the First Amendment, and ordering an inventory and accounting.
Nickel repeatedly failed to comply with the accounting order and was held in contempt. She also continued to occupy the trust-owned home without paying rent and filed claims against the trust for caregiving, fiduciary services, and legal expenses. Following a bench trial, the probate court allowed some of Nickel's claims, denied others, ordered her to repay certain overpayments, and required her to pay rent, including back rent. Nickel appealed, arguing that the probate court lacked jurisdiction because the matter should have been filed as a proceeding rather than a civil action, that her removal violated due process, and that the court erred in its rulings on her trust claims, rent, and attorney fees.
Key Appellate Holding:
Filing a probate trust matter as a civil action rather than as a proceeding initiated by petition is a procedural defect, not a jurisdictional one, and does not make the order removing a trustee immediately appealable of right under MCR 5.801(A)(2).
Under MCR 5.101(A), probate matters may be commenced either as a “proceeding,” begun by petition, or as a “civil action,” begun by complaint. Because plaintiffs invoked the probate court's authority over trust administration under MCL 700.7201(3), and MCL 700.7208 and MCR 5.501(C) require such matters to be initiated by petition, the Court agreed that this case should have been filed as a proceeding. The Court held, however, that this mismatch was not jurisdictional: subject-matter jurisdiction depends on the class of case, not the form in which it is pleaded, and MCR 5.101 governs procedure rather than jurisdiction. Citing In re Gordon Estate, 222 Mich App 148 (1997), the Court concluded that the probate court retained subject-matter jurisdiction despite the improper form of action.
The mislabeling also affected appellate timing. Because the case proceeded as a civil action, the finality definition in MCR 5.801(A)(2)(a), which makes an order removing a fiduciary immediately appealable in a “proceeding,” did not apply. Instead, MCR 5.801(A)(1) controlled, under which the order removing Nickel as trustee was not a final order and was not independently appealable. The order became reviewable only once the probate court entered the final judgment resolving the remaining disputes, and the defendant could then challenge the removal order in the appeal from that later judgment under Green v Ziegelman, 282 Mich App 292 (2009).
Finally, the Court rejected the defendant's due-process challenge to the default entered against her. Due process requires only reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, not that the party actually seize that opportunity. Because the defendant received informal notice before the complaint was filed and was personally served, but chose not to respond in hopes of an out-of-court resolution, she was not deprived of due process by the improper form of the action.
