Court Of Appeals Reverses Trial Court’s Denial Of Grandparenting Time Due To Statutory Right to Present Evidence
Opinion Published: September 10, 2025 (Garrett, Cameron, Mariani)
COA Docket No. 367485
Livingston County Circuit Court
Holding: The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court’s denial of grandparenting time because, under Michigan’s grandparenting time statute, MCL 722.27b, the opportunity to be heard includes at a minimum the right to testify.
Facts: Plaintiff is the acknowledged father via an affidavit of parentage and Defendant is the mother of the minor child at issue, LM. The parties were never married. Appellants are the parents of Defendant and the grandparents of LM. Plaintiff had sole legal and physical custody of LM, and then in 2020, Defendant passed away. From 2016 to 2022, Plaintiff was involved in a romantic relationship with Lyons, and she gave birth to two children. Plaintiff, Lyons, and the three children lived together until their relationship ended in January 2022, when Lyons moved out and took her children with her.
In April 2023, Appellants moved for grandparenting time with LM. Appellants alleged that Plaintiff is not LM’s biological father and that Lyons undertook all caretaking responsibilities for LM. They also alleged that from January 2022 when Lyons moved out until March 2022, LM lived with Lyons rather than with Plaintiff. Plaintiff allowed Lyons to have visitation with LM until December 2022, when LM returned from a trip with Lyons that Appellants paid for. After the trip, Plaintiff refused to allow LM to leave the home with Lyons. In February 2023, Plaintiff allowed Appellants to take LM to dinner for her birthday, where Appellants claim in their motion that LM stated the following: that she felt kidnapped in Plaintiff’s home; Plaintiff was drunk all the time; her bedroom lacked adequate heat; and Plaintiff told LM that Appellants did not love her anymore and did not want to see her. Plaintiff did not allow Appellants to see LM after this day.
Plaintiff opposed the motion, denying the allegations and asking the Trial Court to dismiss the motion because Appellants failed to provide supporting affidavits and failed to rebut the statutory presumption that Plaintiff’s decision to deny them grandparenting time did not create a substantial risk of harm to LM. Appellants withdrew this motion and filed a second motion which included affidavits.
At a referee hearing, the referee recommended that the Trial Court deny the second motion due to Appellants’ failure to rebut Plaintiff’s assertion that the denial of grandparenting time did not create a substantial risk of harm to LM’s mental, physical, or emotional health. Appellants objected, arguing that they demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff’s denial of grandparenting time created a substantial risk of harm to LM. Appellants also argued that Plaintiff is not a fit parent within the meaning of MCL 722.27b(4)(b). At an objection hearing before the Trial Court, Appellants argued that MCL 722.27b(4)(b) entitled them to a hearing where they could present evidence to substantiate their allegations. The Trial Court held that the statute did not entitle them to a hearing because they failed to allege any facts showing that the denial of grandparenting time created a substantial risk of harm to LM. Appellants then appealed.
Key Appellate Rulings:
Under MCL 722.27b(4)(a), grandparents are entitled to a hearing at which they can present evidence to support their claim for grandparent visitation.
The Court noted that subsection (4)(a) of Michigan’s grandparenting time statute references a hearing twice. The first states that “a hearing shall be held by the court on its own motion or if a party requests a hearing.” The second states that “at the hearing, parties submitting affidavits shall be allowed an opportunity to be heard.” The Court held that those two provisions, taken together, entitle grandparents to an evidentiary hearing – the first provision clearly entitles a motioning grandparent to a hearing if requested and the second provision clearly allows parties who submitted affidavits an opportunity to testify at the minimum. The Court noted that the legislature must have intended the second provision to encompass something more than a non-evidentiary hearing at which parties simply present arguments. Further, the Court stated that given the Trial Court’s fact-finding function, it is reasonable that the legislature would intend for a hearing at which evidence could be presented and developed in providing an opportunity to be heard.
