Consent Judgment Of Separate Maintenance Held Binding In Later Divorce
Opinion Published: September 12, 2025 (Swartzle, P.J., Garret and Yates, JJ.)
COA Docket No. 370181
Ontonagon County Circuit Court
Lisa Schmidt of Speaker Law Firm represented the Appellant.
Holding: In a divorce action filed almost ten years after a Consent Judgment of Separate Maintenance was entered including an order to sell the marital home and non-modifiable alimony payments, the Court of Appeals held that the parties’ agreements in the separate maintenance action were binding on the Trial Court in entering a subsequent Judgment of Divorce, except on issues where the parties both requested modification. In so doing, the Court of Appeals expressly overturned the no-longer-binding decision in Engemann v Engemann, 53 Mich App 588; 219 NW2d 777 (1974) in favor of the reasoning in more recent precedent.
Facts: The parties were married in 1982 and had two adult sons. In 2013, the husband filed a complaint for divorce in Houghton County, which was subsequently converted to a separate maintenance action. The parties entered a consent judgment of separate maintenance, which required the parties to sell the marital home “as soon as practicable,” awarded the wife non-modifiable alimony based on the husband’s pension, and awarded the Wife an equalization payment of just over $80,000.
However, the marital home was never sold. At times, each party objected to or interfered with it being listed, and it eventually fell into disrepair. Despite being ordered to vacate the party in 2014, the husband and his friends continued to use it for hunting purposes and to store vehicles until at least 2022. The husband also never paid the equalization payment. On July 8, 2022, the Wife filed a motion to enforce in Houghton County. In response, the Husband filed a new divorce action in Ontonagon County. The parties agreed to proceed with the divorce action and consolidated the matters. Following an order to sell the property, the Wife filed a new motion to enforce consent judgment. Soon after, the parties agreed to allow their adult son to occupy the property, and the Wife and their son cleaned out the last of the Husband’s possessions and made substantial repairs.
At trial, the Husband sought to terminate his alimony obligation because he had less disposable income than the Wife. He also admitted to changing the beneficiary of his life insurance in violation of the consent judgment. The Wife testified to her continued need for spousal support, especially considering the need to obtain replacement health insurance post-judgment. This was the sole basis upon which alimony could be modified according to the consent judgment. She asked the Court to award her the marital home as enforcement of the consent judgment, since the Husband had obstructed its sale, caused her to incur significant expenses in its repair, and still owed her the equalization payment. She also requested that the Husband be ordered to pay her partial rent for overstaying the deadline set out in the consent judgment.
The Trial Court declined to enter a Judgment of Divorce that matched the Consent Judgment of Separate Maintenance, instead modifying it in several respects. It relied on the Engemann decision, allowing it to revisit substantive issues resolved in the consent judgment, including property distribution and spousal support. The Trial Court also said that the waiver of the right to modify spousal support contained in the consent judgment applied only to the separate maintenance action, and not the divorce. It reduced the monthly amount the Wife was to receive from the Husband’s pension by approximately $150 per month and denied the request for increased alimony to cover health insurance costs. It also rejected the request for rent. Noting the reduced value of the marital home, the Trial Court awarded the property to her in lieu of the equalization payment and certain insurance proceeds related to the property’s disrepair. It also terminated the requirement for the Husband to maintain life insurance for the Wife’s benefit and denied the Wife’s request for attorney fees.
Key Appellate Rulings:
Settlement Agreement In Separate Maintenance Held Binding In Divorce
MCL 552.7(1) allows an action for separate maintenance to be filed “on the same grounds as an action for divorce.” Judgments in both actions address the same core issues under MCL 552.101(3) and MCR 3.211(B). The Court of Appeals noted that parties’ settlement agreements in divorce actions are final and binding, on principles of contract, except in certain limited circumstances. Vittiglio v Vittiglio, 297 Mich App 391, 400; 824 NW2d 591 (2012); Andrusz v Andrusz, 320 Mich App 445, 453; 904 NW2d 636 (2017). If the language is ambiguous, it is enforceable. Stoudemire v Thomas, 344 Mich App 34, 45; 999 NW2d 43 (2022).
The Court addressed the Trial Court’s reliance on Engemann, which was non-binding because it was published before 1990. MCR 7.215(J)(1). It said the Engemann decision “contravenes more recent binding precedent” enforcing consent judgments. It therefore overruled “Engemann’s determination that the trial court in a divorce action may modify a previous settlement to which the parties voluntarily agreed to resolve an action for separate maintenance,” and held the Trial Court erred in failing to do so.
Non-Modifiable Alimony Award In Separate Maintenance Must Be Honored
In applying the above decision to the case at hand, the Court found that the Trial Court erred in enforcing the parties’ agreed-upon non-modifiable spousal support (except as to health insurance costs). It said this provision was “valid and enforceable,” relying on Staple v Staple, 241 Mich App 562, 578; 616 NW2d 219 (2000).
Property Division Can Be Modified Upon Request Of Both Parties
However, the Court did not find error in the modification of the parties’ property settlement. It interpreted the Wife’s request at trial as a request to modify, rather than enforce the terms of the consent judgment, noting that the Wife may actually be in a better position under the Trial Court’s award.
Attorney Fees Sanctions On Enforcement Do Not Extend To Entry Of Judgment
Finally, the Court considered the Trial Court’s denial of attorney fees. The consent judgment included attorney fee sanctions if either party had to file a motion to enforce its terms. The Court held this language enforceable but distinguished between the fees incurred for enforcement and those incurred in obtaining a judgment of divorce. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter for a new hearing distinguishing between the two.
