Tiburcio Pena-Cruz v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
COA Opinion Published: October 2, 2026 (O’Brien, P.J., and Borrello and Boonstra, JJ.)
COA Docket No. 364284
Wayne County Circuit Court
Holding: When a vehicle’s owner neither expressly permitted nor expressly prohibited the claimant from taking the vehicle, whether the vehicle was “taken unlawfully” under MCL 500.3113(a) depends on whether the driver took it with the owner’s implied permission. That determination turns on all the facts and circumstances surrounding the taking, as well as the driver’s previous use of the vehicle. The taking is viewed from the driver’s perspective, and the determinative question is whether, from that perspective, the owner impliedly permitted or authorized it. Because the trial court found a genuine issue of material fact based solely on the permission plaintiff received from the owner’s son, the Court of Appeals, on remand from the Supreme Court, vacated that ruling and remanded for the trial court to apply the newly announced implied-permission test.
Facts: Plaintiff Tiburcio Pena-Cruz and his son, Jonathan Pena-Garcia, were involved in a serious collision on December 19, 2020, when the F-150 Tiburcio was driving was rear-ended while he was stopped on the roadway waiting for an accident to clear. The truck was solely owned by Tiburcio’s wife, Maria Garcia-Lopez, with whom he had not lived for about two years. Maria gave Jonathan, who lived with her, permission to take the F-150 that day, and Jonathan drove it to Tiburcio’s house early that morning to give him a ride to work. Because Jonathan was tired, Tiburcio—who was not licensed to drive—took over the driving. Tiburcio knew Maria owned the truck, it was the first time he had driven it, he did not ask Maria for permission, and he testified that even when he lived with Maria, he did not have keys to any vehicles—only house keys. Maria denied giving Tiburcio permission and testified that she would not have let him drive the truck because “he doesn’t have a license.”
Tiburcio sued State Farm for no-fault benefits. State Farm moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that MCL 500.3113(a) barred recovery because Tiburcio took the truck without Maria’s permission and had no reason to believe she would let him take it, given that he was unlicensed and had never used it before. Tiburcio responded that the taking was lawful because Jonathan, who had Maria’s permission, let him drive, and Maria never told either of them that Tiburcio could not use the truck. The trial court agreed with Tiburcio that, because Maria never expressly prohibited him from driving the F-150, Jonathan’s permission created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the taking was lawful. The Court of Appeals granted State Farm leave to appeal.
In its original opinion, the panel—bound by Swoope v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest, 350 Mich App 104; 29 NW3d 695 (2023) (Swoope I)—held that Tiburcio took the truck unlawfully because he used it without the owner’s permission while knowing he did not have a valid license. Pena-Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 14, 2024 (Docket No. 364284). The Supreme Court then reversed Swoope I, holding that the relevant inquiry is whether the vehicle was taken unlawfully, not whether it was operated unlawfully, Swoope v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 166790) (Swoope II), and vacated and remanded this case for reconsideration in light of Swoope II. Pena-Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, ___ Mich ___; 34 NW3d 857 (2026).
Key Appellate Holdings:
When the owner neither expressly permitted nor expressly prohibited the taking, whether a vehicle was “taken unlawfully” under MCL 500.3113(a) depends on whether the driver took it with the owner’s implied permission.
MCL 500.3113(a) disqualifies a person from PIP benefits if, at the time of the accident, the person was willingly operating or using a vehicle that “was taken unlawfully,” and the person knew or should have known that it was taken unlawfully. See Ahmed v Tokio Marine Am Ins Co, 337 Mich App 1, 10; 972 NW2d 860 (2021). The Court explained that the “taken unlawfully” caselaw generally falls into two categories: express-prohibition cases, in which the owner forbade the taking, making it unlawful (Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Michigan, 492 Mich 503; 821 NW2d 117 (2012); Ahmed, 337 Mich App 1), and express-permission cases, in which the owner or purported owner allowed the taking, making it lawful (Rambin v Allstate Ins Co, 495 Mich 316; 852 NW2d 34 (2014); Monaco v Home-Owners Ins Co, 317 Mich App 738; 896 NW2d 32 (2016); Bradley v Westfield Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 365828); VHS of Michigan, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 365479)). This case fell into a third category, for which there was no binding caselaw: Maria neither permitted nor forbade Tiburcio’s taking of her truck.
Two rules from the existing caselaw guided the Court’s analysis. First, the focus is on the legality of the taking, which is distinct from whether the subsequent use or operation of the vehicle was legal. Monaco, 317 Mich App at 749; Swoope II, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 17. Second, a taking is unlawful if it is “without authority” of the owner, as judged from the driver’s perspective. Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 518, 522; Rambin, 495 Mich at 324 n 7; see MCL 750.413; MCL 750.414. Applying those rules, the Court held that an owner’s silence, standing alone, supports neither side. A stranger who borrows a car to run an errand does not take it lawfully merely because the owner never forbade it, and spouses who routinely borrow each other’s cars do not take them unlawfully merely because they never asked first.
Courts must instead determine whether the driver took the vehicle with the owner’s implied authority or permission. That inquiry considers (1) all the facts and circumstances surrounding the taking, including any acts, words, or conduct that would have suggested to the driver that he or she had the owner’s authority or permission, and (2) the driver’s previous use of the vehicle, including any course of frequent or habitual takings with the owner’s knowledge and acquiescence. Accord 8A Couch, Insurance, 3d, § 118:36. The legality of the taking is always viewed from the driver’s perspective, but the determinative question is whether, from that perspective, the owner impliedly permitted or authorized the taking. The Court noted that this test differs from the “implied consent” analysis in Landon v Titan Ins Co, 251 Mich App 633; 651 NW2d 93 (2002), which was imported from the owner’s liability statute, MCL 257.401—an approach Spectrum Health disavowed for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 523.
Permission from a permissive user is not dispositive; it matters only insofar as it bears on the driver’s understanding of whether the owner authorized the taking.
The trial court relied exclusively on a chain-of-permissive-use theory, finding a genuine issue of material fact because Tiburcio took the F-150 with the permission of Jonathan, who had Maria’s permission. The Court held that this was error for two reasons: (1) when the owner is silent, courts must engage in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, and the trial court treated a single fact as dispositive; and (2) the trial court never analyzed whether Tiburcio understood that he was taking the truck with Maria’s permission or authorization, as opposed to Jonathan’s. This reasoning is consistent with Spectrum Health, which held that application of the chain-of-permissive-use theory was inconsistent with the plain language of MCL 500.3113(a) because it asks what the owner could have foreseen rather than examining the legality of the taking from the driver’s perspective. 492 Mich at 520-522.
The driver’s lack of a valid license is likewise relevant, but not dispositive.
State Farm argued that Tiburcio, as an unlicensed driver, would have known that Maria would not authorize him to take her truck. The Court agreed that the lack of a license is relevant, but only insofar as it affected Tiburcio’s understanding of whether Maria would have allowed him to take her vehicle; consistent with Swoope II, the question is whether the taking was unlawful, not whether the operation was unlawful. For the same reason, Maria’s testimony that she would not have allowed Tiburcio to drive because “he doesn’t have a license” is not dispositive, though it is relevant to the extent Tiburcio was aware of her general feelings about his use of her vehicles.
The Court expressly offered no opinion on whether a genuine issue of material fact exists or whether the case should proceed to trial. It vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded for the trial court to apply the implied-permission test in the first instance, considering all the circumstances surrounding Tiburcio’s taking of the F-150 that morning and his past use of the F-150 and other vehicles Maria owned. The Court did not retain jurisdiction.