Montessori School Did Not Breach Its Contract With Parents When It Expelled Their Children

The trial court properly held that the defendant-private school did not breach its contract with the plaintiff-parents when it expelled their children, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.

In Zakharia, et al. v Michigan Montessori Internationale, Inc, et al. (Docket Nos. 369047 and 372364), the Court of Appeals also dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for defamation.

At the outset of its 14-page opinion, the Court of Appeals pointed out the plaintiffs filed numerous claims against the defendants and were representing themselves in the lawsuit.

“When a party comes to us with nine grounds for reversing the [trial] court, that usually means there are none,” the Court of Appeals wrote. “In over 160 pages of briefing, [the plaintiffs] … offer nearly twice that. In this dispute with the private school that expelled their children because of [plaintiff-]Khaled’s conduct, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendants but reverse its award of sanctions.”

Court of Appeals Judge Brock A. Swartzle, Judge Matthew S. Ackerman and Judge Christopher M. Trebilcock were on the panel that issued the unpublished opinion.

Background

The plaintiffs’ two children attended Montessori Radmoor, the defendant’s private school in Okemos, Michigan. Over a period of time, the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant-school deteriorated due to disagreements about school policies and staff decisions.

For example, plaintiff-Khaled Zakharia objected to including yoga in the school’s physical education program, asserting that it conflicted with his family’s Catholic faith. He also disagreed with the school’s COVID-19 mask policy, instructing his son not to wear a mask outside even after the school made it optional. When the plaintiff learned that his son continued to wear a mask, he visited the school at recess to ensure his wishes were being followed, sometimes entering the school playground and ordering his son to take off the mask. Joseph Wood, the Head of School, told the plaintiff that his conduct violated school rules and directed him to speak with his children through the school’s front office.

Another incident involved a student “belittling” the plaintiff’s son for being unfamiliar with NBA legend Michael Jordan. Wood investigated and found that both students were responsible and that the plaintiff’s son had called the classmate “stupid.” The plaintiff disagreed with Wood’s findings and reportedly sent various “accusatory” messages to the school. In response, Wood emailed the plaintiff, saying he was concerned about the plaintiff’s tone and continued partnership with the school. Wood indicated the plaintiff’s language “villainized” a child and that the plaintiff would no longer be allowed to observe at recess because his presence “undermined the safety and trust of the school environment.” The plaintiff replied that this message was “intimidating” and that any attempt to stop him from observing his children would result in a lawsuit. The day after this exchange, the plaintiff went to the school during recess. The school subsequently expelled the plaintiffs’ children, citing the plaintiff’s disrespect toward staff and repeated violations of school policy.

The plaintiffs then filed suit against the defendants in Ingham County Circuit Court, alleging breach of contract and defamation, among other things. The trial court granted summary disposition to the defendants.

The plaintiffs appealed.

Violation Of Parent Handbook

The Court of Appeals first addressed the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, noting the school’s “Parent Handbook” sets forth the terms of its relationship with families. The handbook “expressly provides that student dismissal is a possible response for particularly aggravated forms of parental misconduct, and provides a nonexclusive list of qualifying behaviors …,” the appeals court wrote. “The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim because it held that plaintiff had been expressly told not to come on school grounds to observe recess, but he did so anyway. That was a trespass in direct violation of the final item in the list of behaviors that are grounds for dismissal.”

The plaintiffs argued on appeal that the defendants “acted capriciously in prohibiting Khaled from coming to the school to observe recess,” the Court of Appeals explained. “This is not a relevant observation, however. The Parent Handbook expressly provides that trespassing is a form of major misconduct that warrants expulsion, and there is no dispute that Khaled violated a directive from Wood not to come to the school grounds to observe recess. He therefore was, by definition, trespassing, meaning that under the express terms of the Parent Handbook, he committed conduct that justified expulsion. Nor do the terms of the Parent Handbook make any commitment to consistency; irrespective of what other parents were allowed to do, Khaled was expressly prohibited from coming on school grounds to observe recess, but he did so anyway. … Wood restricted Khaled’s access to the Radmoor property, a directive that Khaled disobeyed. That is a trespass. What is more, Khaled ignores that to the extent he had a contractual right to ‘observe’ his children at school, the handbook expressly states that ‘[i]t is necessary to set up an appointment for observing.’ Not only did Khaled not set up an appointment to ‘observe’ recess, he violated the express directive from Wood to not observe recess.”

Here, the parties “dispute[d] whether there is a zone of discretion that private schools enjoy in making disciplinary decisions,” the Court of Appeals noted. “This is because the trial court explained its decision to grant summary disposition in part as because ‘the school reserved to itself and to the employees the right to take action with regard to conduct that fell within the school’s discretion of … what constituted sufficient misbehavior by either children or parents.’”

Addressing this issue, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that “some other state courts have recognized a special prerogative of private schools to manage their affairs. … But because plaintiffs’ conduct violated an objective provision in the Parent Handbook, we need not resolve whether that rule applies in Michigan. In the analogous circumstance of university education, this Court has applied the ordinary standards of contract interpretation to disputes over whether services have been properly rendered.”

In this case, “[t]here is no dispute that Khaled violated Wood’s directive not to continue coming to the school to observe recess; his conduct therefore is on the Parent Handbook’s list of behaviors justifying expulsion. Radmoor did not breach its contract with plaintiffs,” the Court of Appeals concluded.

Remarks Not Defamatory

Regarding the plaintiffs’ defamation claims, the Court of Appeals said the fundamental questions were whether the alleged remarks were “false and defamatory” and “unprivileged communications.”

“Plaintiffs concede that defendants enjoy a qualified privilege due to their shared interest in the management of the school,” the Court of Appeals observed. “Because a qualified privilege can be overcome if the statement was made with actual malice – knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of the truth – we cannot escape examining the many remarks complained of by plaintiffs. Most of them are laid out in ¶ 190 of plaintiffs’ complaint. For many, plaintiffs are simply not the subject of the remark ….”

Meanwhile, “[s]everal additional statements that plaintiffs allege are defamatory are matters of opinion,” the Court of Appeals stated. “A qualified privilege can be overcome only if the plaintiff can prove actual malice. Plaintiffs here cannot. They simply have no evidence that defendants said these remarks out of anything but a sincere belief in their truth. Irrespective of whether Khaled actually did ‘attack,’ ‘target,’ or ‘villainize’ the student he felt was bullying his son, no reasonable juror could conclude that Wood did not sincerely hold these views. Similarly, whether the summary of Khaled’s relationship with school administration in the expulsion letter was correct or not, any reasonable juror would conclude that Wood … sincerely believed this was a fair characterization of that past history.”

In sum, “all of the remarks which plaintiffs allege defamed them are either not capable of defaming them, were not made with actual malice, or are simply true,” the Court of Appeals said. “The trial court did not err in granting summary disposition on the defamation counts in either case.”

Sanctions Reversed

The Court of Appeals also reversed the trial court’s $500 sanction against the plaintiffs for filing a frivolous action.

A court “must determine whether a claim or defense is frivolous on the basis of the circumstances at the time it was asserted,” the Court of Appeals said, finding that one of the claims the trial court had deemed frivolous “was not devoid of arguable merit at the time it was filed.” As to another claim, the Court of Appeals said the plaintiffs could not have known the identity of the person who made the statement – and that the school could not be liable for it – at the time they filed their lawsuit.

Therefore, “the trial court’s finding of frivolousness was clearly erroneous,” the Court of Appeals held.

Judge: ‘Enough Is Enough’

After the Court of Appeals issued its decision, the plaintiffs filed several motions. In a December 4, 2025 order, the Court of Appeals said: “The motion for leave to exceed the word limit is GRANTED. The motion for reconsideration is DENIED.”

Judge Ackerman concurred and dissented in part to the order. “There is a Yiddish phrase, genug iz genug, meaning ‘enough is enough,’” he wrote. “That sentiment applies here. The introduction to our opinion should have made clear that additional words are unwarranted. ‘When a party comes to us with nine grounds for reversing the [trial] court, that usually means there are none.’ … In over 160 pages of briefing, plaintiffs Khaled and Maral Zakharia offer nearly twice that. In this dispute with the private school that expelled their children because of Khaled’s conduct, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendants but reverse its award of sanctions.’”

Despite that statement in the Court of Appeals opinion, the plaintiffs “now seek leave to file a motion nearly three times the applicable word limit,” Judge Ackerman observed. “Very little of it is necessary; indeed, granting the motion is arguably counterproductive to plaintiffs’ own interests.”

The judge continued, “The irony is that in some ways I sympathize with plaintiffs’ position. Many reasonable people were upset about masking during COVID, and disputes continue about the developmental consequences (both cognitive and social) it had on children. I also have little doubt that many reasonable people would find defendants’ approach to conflict resolution among students irksome. Plaintiffs’ frustrations are not entirely illegitimate.”

However, “rather than vote with their feet and take their business to another school, plaintiffs knowingly defied clear directives from defendants because, in the words of Khaled’s deposition testimony, compliance ‘would have been too humiliating to do, and I chose not to do it,’” Judge Ackerman wrote. “Eventually defendants reached the end of what they would tolerate. Plaintiffs’ meritless claims have now been carefully scrutinized by the courts and rejected. Unable to accept that outcome, they seek still more space to air trifling objections to our effort at processing what I calculate to be 173 pages of briefing and 1,021 pages of appendices previously filed with this Court.”

Therefore, “I would deny leave to file a motion in excess of the word limit,” the judge stated. “Because the majority has accepted the filing, however, I concur in the denial of the motion for reconsideration.”