SCOTUS: Trial Court Must First Find ‘Screening’ Is Necessary For Child Witness

A father convicted of sexually abusing his young daughter was denied his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, because the trial court did not first make a finding that “screened” testimony of the child victim, which was allowed by state law, was necessary.

The case of Pitts v Mississippi (607 U.S. ____ (2025); Docket No. No. 24-1159), concerned Miss. Code Ann. §99–43–101(2)(g), which provides that a child witness “shall have the … righ[t]” to a “properly constructed screen that would permit the judge and jury in the courtroom … to see the child but would obscure the child’s view of the defendant.” Relying on this statute, a Mississippi trial court allowed the use of a screen in the defendant-father’s trial for sexually abusing his young daughter. The trial court, however, did not take any evidence or make any case-specific findings that the screen was needed to protect the child witness. After a jury convicted the defendant, he appealed.

A divided Mississippi Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the defendant’s conviction, finding that Miss. Code Ann. §99–43–101(2)(g), along with victims’ rights provisions, distinguished the defendant’s case from Coy v Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), and Maryland v Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). Both Coy and Craig require specific findings be made by the court before restricting a defendant’s constitutional right to face-to-face confrontation.

The defendant appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court (the Court). He argued that his screened testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness because the state did not first establish that the screen was necessary. The Court granted the defendant’s petition for certiorari and reversed, finding the Mississippi courts did not follow established precedent and that Coy and Craig controlled.

“[B]efore invoking this [screen] procedure, a court must proceed with care,” the Court wrote. “It must ‘hear evidence’ and make a ‘case specific’ finding of ‘[t]he requisite … necessity.’ … Simply pointing to a state statute that authorizes screening, even one premised on ‘generalized finding[s]’ of necessity, will not suffice. … Because the Mississippi Supreme Court departed from these principles, we reverse.”

Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to consider whether the Sixth Amendment violation was “harmless error.”

Background

The child, A.G.C., told her mother that her father, the defendant, sexually abused her during a weekend visit. Criminal charges were filed against the defendant. At trial, the State of Mississippi moved to allow the placement of a screen between the child and the defendant when she took the witness stand. To support its motion, the State of Mississippi cited Miss. Code Ann. §99–43–101(2)(g).

The defendant objected. Although he did not question the statute’s mandatory terms, he argued those terms had to “give way to the Sixth Amendment’s demands.” He claimed the State of Mississippi had not tried to meet – and could not meet – its Sixth Amendment burden of proving that screening was necessary in his case.

The trial judge granted the State of Mississippi’s motion, reasoning that the Miss. Code Ann. §99–43–101(2)(g) “appears to be mandatory” and expressing “concerns about [his] ability to declare the statute unconstitutional and fail[ing] to follow it.” A jury convicted the defendant of sexual abuse.

The defendant appealed. Relying on Coy and Craig, he argued the trial court failed to make the case-specific finding of necessity that the Sixth Amendment requires and sought a new trial.

The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s arguments. Although the court did not dispute the trial court did not make a case-specific finding of necessity, it attempted to distinguish Coy and Craig. The court further held that Mississippi’s mandatory statute “provided sufficient authority for the screening in this case.” The dissenting justice in the case asserted that Coy and Craig controlled and that the trial court failed to comply with case precedent.

The defendant appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.

Unpersuasive Distinctions

In a per curiam opinion, the Court explained that, under Coy and Craig, a trial court may not deny a defendant his/her Sixth Amendment right to confront accusers face-to-face “simply because a state statute permits screening.”

Further, a court may not “authorize screening based on ‘generalized finding[s]’ of necessity underlying such a statute,” the Court stated. “Instead, the Sixth Amendment tolerates screening in child-abuse cases only if a court ‘hear[s] evidence’ and issues a ‘case-specific’ finding of ‘[t]he requisite … necessity.’”

Here, the Mississippi Supreme Court “attempted to avoid these constraints by distinguishing Coy and Craig in various ways,” the Court said. “But none of the court’s distinctions persuades.”

First, the Mississippi Supreme Court “pointed to a victims’ rights provision in Mississippi’s State Constitution,” the Court observed. “That provision affords the state legislature the power ‘to enact … laws to … protect the rights guaranteed to victims.’ … And, the court observed, the state legislature exercised this power when it adopted the mandatory screening law the trial court applied in this case. … But, true as all that may be, it is also irrelevant. When state law conflicts with the Federal Constitution, the latter controls. … And under the Sixth Amendment, neither state screening statutes, nor the ‘generalized finding[s]’ on which they are premised, are enough to overcome a defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation.”

Second, the Mississippi Supreme Court emphasized that the state law mandates screening in child-abuse cases, while the Iowa statute in Coy “only afforded trial courts discretion to screen,” the Court said. “But, if anything, the fact that Mississippi’s statute is mandatory – and thus never requires a case-specific finding of necessity – renders it ‘more constitutionally problematic than the statute at issue in Coy, not less so.’”

Third, the Mississippi Supreme Court “emphasized that A. G. C. was [4] years old at the time of trial,” the Court wrote. “But Craig involved a 6-year-old witness. … And though a witness’s age is a relevant consideration, Craig made plain that a court must ‘hear evidence’ and make a ‘case-specific’ ‘finding of necessity’ before denying a defendant the right to face-to-face confrontation in a child abuse case.”

Fourth, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that, in Coy, “the government and the defendant disputed who committed the alleged assault, while in this case the identity of the alleged perpetrator was not in question,” the Court said. “But the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accusers face to face does not only apply in cases where identity is at issue. … Nor does Craig’s exception for child-abuse cases automatically apply just because identity happens to be uncontested.”

Lastly, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted the child witness and lawyers in Craig “were placed in a different room from the defendant, with cross-examination conducted over closed-circuit television,” the Court explained. “In this case, by contrast, everyone remained in the courtroom, the witness and defendant separated only by a screen. … But both approaches deviate from the Sixth Amendment’s usual rule that a defendant is entitled to meet his accusers ‘face to face.’ … And both thus require a case-specific finding of necessity.”

Meanwhile, “the State [of Mississippi] does not so much defend the Mississippi Supreme Court’s various efforts to distinguish Coy and Craig as press a different argument still,” the Court wrote. “As the State sees it, the trial court did ‘hear evidence’ and make a ‘case-specific’ ‘finding of necessity.’ … We disagree. At trial, to be sure, the prosecution represented that A. G. C.’s guardian believed it would be difficult for her to testify face to face with her father. … But the prosecution expressly rejected the notion that it had ‘to put on any proof,’ choosing to rely instead on Mississippi’s mandatory ‘right’ to screening. … And the trial judge proceeded to rule that the ‘statute … appears to be mandatory’ and expressed concerns about ‘fail[ing] to follow it.’ … Those arguments and conclusions fall well short of the procedures and findings Coy and Craig require.”

Harmless Error?

The Court continued by emphasizing that “[j]ust because a constitutional error took place at trial does not necessarily mean a new one must be held. Even constitutional errors are sometimes subject to a ‘harmless-error’ rule and do not require a new trial if the prosecution can show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’”

Therefore, on remand, the State of Mississippi “remains free to argue, and the Mississippi Supreme Court remains free to consider, whether the error in this case warrants a new trial under the harmless-error standard,” the Court held.

“The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion,” the Court concluded. “It is so ordered.”